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Note
TELEVISION COVERAGE OF TRIALS: CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION AGAINST ABSOLUTE DENIAL OF
ACCESS IN THE ABSENCE OF A
COMPELLING INTEREST
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1934, Bruno Hauptmann was prosecuted for the kidnapping and
murder of Charles Lindbergh, Jr., the son of the first pilot to success-
fully make a transatlantic flight.' Because of the notoriety of the crime
and the popularity of Charles Lindbergh, Sr., there was intense public
interest in the Hauptmann trial. As a consequence of this interest, over
150 reporters and photographers packed the courtroom throughout the
trial.2 The publicity was adverse to Hauptmann, who was convicted and
sentenced to death.3 In response to the intense publicity generated by
the trial, various canons and rules were developed to prevent a recur-
rence of the atmosphere that prevailed at the Hauptmann trial. The
American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates adopted Judicial
Canon 35, which recommended the banning of all photographic and
broadcast coverage of courtroom proceedings. 4 To reflect technologi-
1. See M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 597 (2d ed.
1982). When the Lindbergh child was kidnapped in 1932, and his body found in
a shallow grave near the Lindbergh house, the story was front-page news for
weeks. H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 265 (3d ed.
1978).
2. H. NELSON & D. TEETER, supra note 1, at 265. When Hauptmann was
tried for the crime in 1934, 150 reporters packed the courtroom and at times
over 700 reporters were in Flemington, NewJersey, the site of the trial. Id. (cit-
ingJ. LOFTON, JUSTICE AND THE PRESS 103-04 (1966)).
3. Id. A special American Bar Association (ABA) committee set up after the
Hauptmann trial noted that the trial was "the most spectacular and depressing
example of improper publicity and professional misconduct ever presented to
the people of the United States in a criminal trial." Report of Special Committee on
Cooperation Between Press, Radio and Bar, 62 ABA REP. 851, 861 (1937).
In addition, the newsreel cameramen at the Hauptmann trial persuaded the
trial judge to allow a camera in the balcony, which overlooked the jury and wit-
ness stand, after they had promised the judge that they would only film the trial
during recesses. Films of the proceedings, however, later showed up in newsreel
theatres. J. GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME: COURTS AND PRESS IN CONFLICT 152
(1983).
4. H. NELSON & D. TEETER, supra note 1, at 265. In proscribing photo-
graphic coverage of courtroom proceedings, Canon 35, which was adopted in
1937, stated:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and
decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during ses-
sions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting of
(1267)
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cal changes in the broadcast medium, Canon 35 was later amended to
also proscribe television coverage of trials. 5 Currently, the federal
courts do not permit the photographing of courtroom proceedings and
state courts permit it only at their discretion."
Despite this total prohibition against cameras in federal court-
rooms, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of
whether a per se rule against cameras in the courtroom is constitutional.
The first amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridg-
ing freedom of speech or the press. 7 The fifth amendment" and sixth
amendment' guarantee a defendant the right to a fair trial. These two
court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of
the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with re-
spect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS oFJUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 35 (1937). Ca-
non 35 was later amended to also proscribe television coverage. For a discus-
sion of the current ABA judicial canon proscribing television coverage of court
proceedings, see infra note Il1 and accompanying text.
Although Canon 35 and similar ABA standards are not binding on courts,
the canon did express the ABA's opposition to cameras in the courtroom. Jus-
tice Harlan, in an appendix to his concurring opinion in Estes v. Texas, traced the
development of Canon 35. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 596-601 app.
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). In addition, prior to the adoption of Canon 35,
the impropriety of broadcasting court proceedings was recognized by the ABA's
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances in its Opinion No. 67, in
1932. Id. at 597 n.3 app. (Harlan,J., concurring) (citing ABA Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 67 (1932)).
5. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 562-63 (1981). The ABA amended
Canon 35 in 1952 to specifically proscribe television coverage. Id.
6. See supra notes 29-31 & 101-105 and accompanying text.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment. provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances." Id. The first amendment has also been held to apply to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
Id. See hi Re Murchison, 399 U.S. 133, 136 (1954) (fair trial in fair tribunal is
basic requirement of due process). These rights have also been held to apply to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Irvin v. Dowd, 336 U.S. 717
(1961); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
1268
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interests have come into conflict when the press has sought to cover
certain judicial proceedings with photographic and television equip-
ment. This inherent constitutional conflict raises questions of whether,
in the first instance, access for cameras to the courtroom can be abso-
lutely prohibited under the first amendment, and whether, in the ab-
sence of an absolute ban, first amendment considerations are
outweighed by the fifth and sixth amendment guarantees of a fair trial in
the circumstances of the particular case.
This Note will examine the parameters of the rights and guarantees
embodied in the first, fifth, and sixth amendments. In addition, this
Note will analyze the reasoning that courts have used to uphold an abso-
lute ban under constitutional attack. Finally, methods will be proposed
for satisfying both the press' right of camera access to trials and the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Due Process Limitations
Despite the passage of Canon 35 in 1937, and over the objection of
defendants, Colorado allowed cameras in its state courtrooms.' Texas
similarly continued to permit cameras in its courtrooms, subject to the
discretion of the trial judge. I I In Estes v. Texas, 12 the United States
Supreme Court for the first time addressed the due process problems
raised by the presence of cameras in the courtroom. In Estes, the de-
fendant was prosecuted for allegedly masterminding a large-scale swin-
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. Rights under the sixth amendment, such as the right of confrontation, have
been held to be essential to a fair trial. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405
(1965).
10. J. GERALD, supra note 3, at 155. Prior to the 1960's, broadcasters were
successful in gaining access to trial and appellate proceedings in Colorado.
Judges maintained control and guidance over the use of television cameras in
Colorado courtrooms. One reason Colorado allowed the use of cameras in its
courtrooms was the courts' sensitivity to political conditions and their previous
experience with cameras in the courtroom. Id. When the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Estes v. Texas erected a barrier to cameras in the courtroom, Colorado
stopped allowing their use. For a discussion of Estes, see infra notes 12-16 and
accompanying text. But Colorado was also the first state to return to cameras in
the courtroom after the Estes decision. J. GERALD, supra note 3, at 157.
11. J. GERALD, supra note 3, at 155. In Texas, like Colorado, judges were
sensitive to political conditions and had considerable experience with cameras in
the courtroom since photographers in courtrooms were commonplace until the
Estes decision in 1965. Id. The Texas State Bar favored allowing cameras in the
courtroom and the use of the cameras was left to the discretion of the trial judge.
Id.
12. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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die. 13 Despite the defendant's pretrial motion to exclude all cameras,
the state trial judge allowed the televising of a pretrial hearing and the
televising of the trial on a restricted basis.14 On appeal the Supreme
Court, in a five to four decision with the majority split three ways,1'5 re-
13. Id. at 534 n. 1. The evidence presented at the trial indicated that Estes
made fraudulent representations to local farmers that convinced the farmers to
buy fertilizer tanks that did not exist. Id. at 534. Estes was subsequently con-
victed in a Texas court on charges of swindling. Id. at 534.
14. Id. at 535-36. Even before the proceedings began, the Estes case at-
tracted national attention and eleven volumes of press clippings concerning Estes
were on file with the court clerk. Id. at 535. The defense moved to prevent the
broadcast of the trial and for a continuance. The pretrial hearing on these mo-
tions was carried live by radio and television. Id. at 535-36. The Supreme Court
noted that there were at least twelve cameramen in the courtroom during the
hearing providing television, motion picture, and photographic coverage. In ad-
dition, cables were run across the courtroom's floor and microphones were
placed throughout the courtroom. Id. at 536. These activities led to considera-
ble disruption of the judicial proceedings. Id.
15. Id. at 534, 552, 587. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court.
Id. at 534. Justice Clark began his analysis with the proposition that the sixth
amendment guarantees the accused a public trial to ensure that the accused is
treated fairly. Id. at 538. While the press serves an important role and the press
must be accorded maximum freedom, Justice Clark stated that the press, in the
exercise of its function in a democratic society, must be subject to restrictions
for the preservation of absolute fairness in the judicial process. Id. at 539. Fur-
ther, Justice Clark concluded that it was not discriminatory to exclude camer-
amen from the courtroom while allowing access to newspaper reporters. Justice
Clark noted that all members of the press, as well as members of the public,
were allowed access to the courtroom. Id. at 540. The newspaper reporter,
however, is not allowed to bring his typewriter into the courtroom, just as the
television reporter may not bring a camera into the courtroom. Id. When the
presence of cameras in the courtroom would not create hazards to the process of
a fair trial, Justice Clark commented that a different case would then be
presented to the Court. Id. In addition, television coverage does not contribute
to ascertaining the truth at trial, Justice Clark wrote; rather, it injects an irrele-
vant factor into the proceedings. Id. at 544. For a discussion of the portion of
Justice Clark's opinion relating to the hazards of television coverage, see infra
note 16 and accompanying text.
Chief Justice Warren, who was joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg,
concurred and wrote separately. 381 U.S. at 552. (Warren, C.J., concurring).
While ChiefJustice Warren joined the opinion of the Court, he wrote to further
argue that the televising of criminal trials is inherently a violation of a defend-
ant's due process rights. Id. Chief Justice Warren argued that the Estes trial
provided an illustration of the inherent prejudice involved in televising a crimi-
nal trial. Id. He stated that the sixth amendment not only defines the defend-
ant's rights, but also guarantees that these rights are to be specifically enjoyed at
the trial. Id.
The Chief Justice argued that televising a criminal trial violated the sixth
and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 565 (Warren, C.J., concurring). He based
his conclusion on three grounds. First, the televising of a trial diverts the trial
from its proper purpose and inevitably impacts upon all the trial participants.
Second, televising trials presents the public with the wrong impression of' the
purpose of trials, which in turn detracts from the dignity and reliability of trials.
Third, such coverage of trials singles out certain defendants and subjects these
defendants to prejudicial conditions not experienced by others. Id. Moreover,
in ChiefJustice Warren's view, the Constitution, experience in applying the pro-
1270 [Vol. 30: p. 1267
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versed the defendant's conviction, finding that the television coverage
violated the defendant's due process right to a fundamentally fair trial. ' 6
Justice Harlan, in casting the crucial fifth vote for the Estes majority, lim-
visions of the Constitution, and the nation's common law heritage committed
the Court to the position that the purpose of the criminal trial is to provide a fair
and reliable determination of guilt. Id.
Chief Justice Warren also expressed concern about how the media would
present the trial and about the likely intrusions in the trial process that would be
caused by the media. The public, the Chief Justice argued, would equate the
trial process with other forms of entertainment regularly seen on television. Id.
at 571 (Warren, C.J., concurring). ChiefJustice Warren further expressed a fear
that the television industry, believing that a trial was not sufficiently dramatic,
would provide expert commentary on the trial and anticipate potential legal
strategies. Id. at 572 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Furthermore, the more accepted television became in the courtroom, Chief
Justice Warren reasoned, the more sacrifices would have to be made to accom-
modate the media. Id. For example, this could include physical alterations in
the layout of the courtroom. Id. The ChiefJustice also feared that judges would
become partners of the media, thereby causing a threat to the integrity of the
trial process. This could conceivably lead, he argued, to the television industry
influencing the time and date trials were scheduled. Id. at 573 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring). In essence, ChiefJustice Warren argued that television coverage of
trials would lead to the commercialization of the trial process. Id. at 574 (War-
ren, C.J., concurring).
Justice Harlan cast the necessary fifth vote. While he also joined the Court's
opinion, he did so subject to the limitations expressed in his concurrence. For a
discussion ofJustice Harlan's concurrence in Estes, see infra note 17 and accom-
panying text.
16. 381 U.S. at 536-52. The proceedings in Estes were televised over the
objection of the defendant and there was widespread public interest in the trial
activities. The Supreme Court articulated several concerns about the television
coverage and how it could cause unfairness during the proceedings. Id. at 544-
50. The Court considered the following factors in its analysis. First, the televis-
ing of proceedings could prejudice jurors and subject them to pressure from
friends and neighbors when the media created intense public feeling against the
defendant. Id, at 545. Second, the quality of testimony could be impaired. Wit-
nesses would know their testimony was being viewed, which would make some
witnesses frightened, others cocky and others embarrassed. In general, the tes-
timony of witnesses would be influenced by the presence of cameras in the
courtroom. Id. at 547. Third, televising a trial would place additional responsi-
bilities on the trialjudge. Id. at 548. A trial judge must ensure that a defendant
receives a fair trial; therefore, when a trial is being televised, the judge must also
supervise the coverage. In addition, the media could pressure judges, both in
the decision whether to allow broadcast coverage and in supervising the cover-
age itself. Id. at 548-49. Fourth, cameras could have an adverse impact on the
defendant. There would be close-ups of the defendant, his movements would
be closely monitored and his ability to concentrate on the trial would be ad-
versely affected. Id. at 549.
In considering the impact of television coverage on criminal trials, the
Court stated:
The television camera is a powerful weapon. Intentionally or inad-
vertently it can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the pub-
lic .... The necessity for sponsorship weighs heavily in favor of the
televising of only notorious cases, such as this one, and invariably fo-
cuses the lens upon the unpopular or infamous .... We have already
examined the ways in which public sentiment can affect the trial partici-
5
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ited the prohibition of cameras from the courtroom to cases where there
was great public interest.
17
Several justices have construed the Estes decision as setting a per se
rule against television coverage of trials, at least when the defendant
objected. 18 This interpretation, however, has been refuted by a majority
pants. To the extent that television shapes that sentiment, it can strip
the accused of a fair trial.
Id. at 549-50.
17. Id. at 587-96 (Harlan, J., concurring). While Justice Harlan concurred
in the opinion of the Court, he did so only to the extent indicated in his opinion.
Id. at 587 (Harlan,J., concurring). Although Justice Harlan noted that cameras
at their worst could be quite intrusive, television coverage of trials had to be
judged as it was at the Estes trial-relatively unobtrusive, with cameras in a booth
in the back of the courtroom. Id. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The sixth amendment provision for a public trial, Justice Harlan wrote, em-
bodies a right for the accused and not the public. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
The impact of televisions in the courtroom would vary according to the particu-
lar case involved since the effect on the accused's constitutional rights would
vary from case to case. Id. While Justice Harlan did not suggest that a distinc-
tion should necessarily be drawn on the basis of the particular case involved, he
did suggest that the Court proceed slowly in determining whether television
coverage would violate a defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 590-91
(Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan noted that the sensationalism involved
in the television coverage of trials, especially those trials with high public inter-
est, had the potential to disrupt the integrity of the trial process. Id. at 592
(Harlan,J., concurring). Justice Harlan found that the circumstances of the cov-
erage of the Estes trial violated the defendant's right to a fair trial, but stated that,
although the decision was demanded by this case, the circumstance of television
coverage would not necessarily require such a decision. Id. at 595 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). He wrote:
Finally, we should not be deterred from making the constitutional
judgment which this case demands by the prospect that the day may
come when television will have become o commonplace an affair in the
daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood
that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process. If and
when that day arrives the constitutional judgment called for now would
of course be subject to re-examination in accordance with the tradi-
tional workings of the Due Process Clause. At the present juncture I
can only conclude that televised trials, at least in cases like this one,
possess such capabilities for interfering with the even course of the ju-
dicial process that they are constitutionally banned.
Id. at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 584 (1981) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). In his concurrence in Chandler, Justice Stewart stated that Estes announced
a per se rule that the fourteenth amendment prohibited cameras from a state
courtroom when a criminal trial was in progress. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring)
(citing Estes, 381 U.S. at 614). On this basis, Justice Stewart was unable to join
the Court's opinion in Chandler. Justice White expressed a similar position in his
concurrence in Chandler. Id. at 587 (White, J., concurring). Justice White wrote
that Estes is fairly read as establishing a per se constitutional rule against the
televising of any criminal trial if the defendant objects. Id. (White, J., concur-
ring). Thus, Justice White concluded that Estes had to be overturned to allow
the television coverage permitted in the Chandler case. Id. (White, J., concur-
ring). For a review of the Chandler Court's discussion of Estes, see hi'ja note 19
and accompanying text.
1272 [Vol. 30: p. 1267
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of the Supreme Court. " Nevertheless, in a series of cases in the 1960s,
the Supreme Court demonstrated its willingness to overturn convictions
when a trial was subject to pervasive adverse publicity.2
Despite the possibility that television coverage of a trial could result
in the reversal of a conviction if a criminal defendant's due process
rights were violated, some states continued to allow cameras in their
courtrooms. 2 ' In 1980, Florida's experimental program for allowing
television coverage of courtroom proceedings was challenged in Chan-
dler v. Florida2 2 by defendants who charged that the coverage denied
19. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 570-74 (1981). For a discussion
of the circumstances of the Chandler case, see infra notes 22-28 and accompany-
ing text. The Chandler Court stated that the Court's opinion in Estes was only a
plurality, and Justice Harlan's concurrence provided the necessary fifth vote for
the judgment. Id. at 570-71. The Chandler Court interpreted Justice Harlan's
opinion as limiting the Estes decision to the particular circumstances of the case.
Id. at 573 (citing Es/es, 381 U.S. at 587 (HarlanJ., concurring)). Therefore, the
Court concluded that Estes did not stand for a constitutional bar against televi-
sion coverage in all cases. Id.
20. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551-53 (1976). In Me-
braska Press, the Supreme Court discussed a number of the cases in which the
defendant's due process rights had been violated because of pervasive press cov-
erage. Id. at 551-52 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (overturning
defendant's conviction for murder on ground that defendant was denied fair
trial because press had prompted wave of public passion against defendant);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (defendant's conviction for murder,
kidnapping, and robbery was reversed because his confession had been filmed
and broadcast while he was awaiting trial); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966) (defendant's conviction was overturned because of impact of pretrial
publicity: Court also noted that trial court had duty to protect defendant's con-
stitutional right to fair trial)).
21. J. GERALD, supra note 3, at 157. In 1970, Colorado was the first state to
allow cameras in the courtroom after the E,/es decision. Id. Colorado's earlier
experience with cameras reduced opposition to their return to the courtroom.
Id. Seven years later, the Supreme Court of Washington issued guidelines that
permitted the use of cameras in that state's courtrooms. Id. The state of Florida
also allowed cameras in its courtrooms in 1976. Id. For a discussion of Florida's
programn, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
22. 449 U.S. at 560 (1981). In 1976, Florida's Supreme Court announced
an experimental program that initially allowed the televising of one civil trial and
one criminal trial under specific guidelines. Id. at 564. Under the original
guidelines, the consent of all the parties was required. Id. It became clear, how-
ever, that it was difficult to gain the consent of all the parties. The Florida
Supreme Court consequently revised its order for a one-year test period to allow
the televising of all judicial proceedings without requiring the consent of the
participants. Id. at 564-65. Under this revised order, detailed guidelines gov-
erned the type of electronic equipment allowed and the manner which it could
be used during judicial proceedings. In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations,
347 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1977). Following the expiration of this one-year pro-
gram, the court promulgated a revised judicial canon which permitted cameras
in Florida courtrooms. 449 U.S. at 566. In promulgating this canon, the Florida
Supreme Court rejected any constitutional right of access for cameras. Id. at
569. The Florida Supreme Court's implementing guidelines specified that no
more than one camera and one camera technician were allowed in a courtroom.
Pool coverage was required if more than one news organization wanted to
12731985] NOTE
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them a fair and impartial trial. In Chandler, the Supreme Court ruled
that television coverage of a criminal trial did not inherently violate the
Constitution. 23 The Court further concluded that such coverage was
permissible even over a defendant's objection.2 4 While the Chandler
Court indicated that broadcast coverage of a trial could affect a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial in some cases, this risk did not justify an absolute
constitutional ban against broadcast coverage.2 5 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, stated that there were potential difficulties, such
as the media singling out sensational cases, which could raise due pro-
cess concerns.2 The Chief Justice also noted, however, that no avail-
able empirical evidence demonstrated that the presence of cameras in
the courtroom would necessarily have an adverse effect on a defendant's
right to a fair trial.2 7 The Chief Justice noted that since Estes was de-
broadcast a trial. Id. at 566. Additionally, artificial lighting was not allowed and
the equipment had to be located in a fixed position. The guidelines further
specified that a judge, at his discretion, could exempt the testimony of a witness
from television coverage, and the media was prohibited from filming the jury.
Id.
23. 449 U.S. at 582-83. The Court held that the presence of cameras did
not violate the Constitution under all circumstances; therefore, the states must
be free to experiment. Id. at 582-83. The Court stated:
It is not necessary either to ignore or discount the potential danger
to the fairness of a trial in a particular case in order to conclude that
Florida may permit the electronic media to cover trials in its state
courts. Dangers lurk in this, as in most experiments, but unless we
were to conclude that television coverage under all conditions is pro-
hibited by the Constitution, the states must be free to experiment.
Id. at 582.
24. Id. at 577. While a trial could be televised over the objection of the
defendant, the Supreme Court noted that Florida still required the objections of
the accused to be heard and considered on the record by the trial court. Id. The
Chandler Court stated that such a provision preserves the defendant's right of
appeal and ensures review to determine if his right to a fair trial was violated by
the television coverage.
25. Id. at 574-75. The Court concluded:
An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials can-
not be justified simply because there is a danger that, in some cases,
prejudicial broadcast accounts of pretrial and trial events may impair
the ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninflu-
enced by extraneous matter. The risk ofjuror prejudice in some cases
does not justify an absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the
printed media; so also the risk of such prejudice does not warrant an
absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast coverage .... [T]he appro-
priate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's right to
demonstrate that the media's coverage of his case-be it printed or
broadcast-compromised the ability of the particular jury that heard
the case to adjudicate fairly.
Id.
26. Id. at 580. ChiefJustice Burger noted that it is within the media's dis-
cretion to decide what trials would be televised. Id. Thus, factors that would
affect the public interest, such as the nature of the crime or the status or position
of the defendant, would govern the media's decision. Id.
27. Id. at 578-79. Chief justice Burger observed that "at present no one
1274
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cided, there had been major technological advances which had reduced
the intrusiveness of broadcast equipment.28
Notwithstanding the Chandler decision, which clearly rejected an ab-
solute constitutional barrier to televising trial and courtroom proceed-
ings, the use of cameras remains totally banned from federal
courtrooms.2 1- The barriers to the use of cameras in the federal courts
are found in local federal court rules 30 and the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. 3 ' Additionally, ChiefJustice Burger has expressed hos-
tility to permitting cameras in federal courtrooms.3 2
B. Right of Access
In Chandler, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether the presence of cameras in a courtroom during a criminal trial
constituted a per se violation of the Constitution in the context of a de-
fendant seeking to determine the scope of his sixth amendment rights.3 3
has been able to present empirical data sufficient to establish that the mere pres-
ence of the broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect on that process."
Id.
28. Id. at 576. Empirical data was introduced revealing that many of the
problems that the Court focused on in Estes, such as cumbersome equipment,
cables, lighting and the like, were no longer substantial factors because of tech-
nological advances. Id. Florida conducted a survey of program participants and
the results, though somewhat limited, indicated that the media had the ability to
minimize the disruptive effects of cameras in the courtroom. Id. at 576 n.1 1.
29. See United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 2094 (1983); Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16 (1984) (review-
ing ban of television coverage of federal court proceedings).
30. See FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES (Pike & Fisher ed. 1984). The word-
ing of these rules varies fiom jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The rule for the east-
ern district of Pennsylvania reads in part:
(a) No judicial proceedings may be broadcast by radio or television,
or filmed by still or motion-picture camera, except that investitive, nat-
uralization or other ceremonial proceedings may be broadcast, or
filmed, subject to the supervision of the Clerk ....
E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
31. See FEt. R. CRIM. P. 53. Rule 53 provides that the "taking of photo-
graphs in the court room during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio
broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court room shall not be permitted
by the court." Id. Congress authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982).
32. Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 13, 1984, at 8, col. 1. Recently, ChiefJus-
tice Burger made what is believed to be his first public statement reflecting his
hostility toward cameras in the courtroom. He stated that no cameras would be
allowed in the Supreme Court while he sat on the Court. Id.
33. 449 U.S. at 567-69. For a discussion of Chandler, see supra notes 22-28
and accompanying text.
Supreme Court cases to this point focused on the issue of cameras in the
courtroom in light of a defendant's rights, rather than from the perspective of
first amendment rights. The Court, nonetheless, did discuss the media's right of
access to a limited extent in both Chandler and Esles. In Chandler, the Court noted
that the Florida Supreme Court, in promulgating the rule that allowed cameras
in the courtroom, rejected any state or federal constitutional right of access on
9
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Any restriction on the media's access to courtrooms, however, also nec-
essarily involves a consideration of first amendment rights. The
Supreme Court addressed the interaction of these constitutional rights
in a series of cases beginning with Nebraska Press Association v. Stewart.3 4
In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court affirmed the press' right to
publish information concerning judicial proceedings. The state trial
judge in Nebraska Press issued a restraining order prohibiting the press
from publishing certain information about the trial.3 5 While indicating
that prior restraints on the press come before the Court with a heavy
presumption against their constitutionality,3 "° the Court did not fore-
the part of the media to televise or electronically record trial proceedings. 449
U.S. at 569. The Florida court relied on the holding in Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). This, however, constituted the Supreme
Court's entire discussion of first amendment rights in Chandler. For a discussion
of l'arner, see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
In Eses, it was argued that the first amendment extended the media a right
to televise from the courtroom, and that to prohibit such coverage discriminated
between newspapers and television. 381 U.S. at 539. The Court stated, how-
ever, that this argument misconceived the rights of the press. While the press is
to be granted maximum freedom, the press must exercise its function subject to
restrictions designed to maintain fairness in the judicial process. Id. Further-
more, prohibiting cameras from courtrooms was not discriminatory since all the
media were allowed access subject to restrictions. Newspaper reporters were
not allowed to bring typewriters into a courtroom; therefore, the Court con-
cluded that not permitting television reporters to bring cameras into the court-
room was not discriminatory. Id. at 540. Thus, in both Chandler and Estes, the
Court's discussion of the first amendment was peripheral to the discussion of the
fair trial issues.
34. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980): Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In _xamining these cases, the Supreme
Court found that although the trial itself was over, the first amendment consid-
erations were not moot because the controversy was one that was "capable of
repetition yet evading review." See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 377 (quoting Southern
Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
35. 427 U.S. at 543-44. The case arose after a Nebraska trial judge entered
an order restraining the press' publication of information concerning the trial of
a defendant charged with six counts of murder. Id. at 541. The trial judge's
order, which was to be effective until the jury was impaneled, prohibited the
press from reporting, inter alia, on the following subjects: the existence and con-
tents of the defendant's confession, the nature of the defendant's statements to
other persons, and the contents of a note written by the defendant on the night
of the crime. Id. at 543-44. The order also prohibited the press from reporting
on the exact nature of the restraining order. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court
later modified and limited the trial judge's order. Id. at 545. Some of the infor-
mation the press was prevented from reporting, however, had already been in-
troduced in open court proceedings. Id. at 543.
36. Id. at 558 (citing Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968)).
In Carroll, the petitioners, members of a white supremacy political party, held a
rally, prompting local officials to obtain a restraining order to prevent the peti-
tioners from holding further rallies for ten days. The restraining order was set
aside because it was obtained ex parte and the petitioners had no oppOrtunity to
participate in the proceedings. 393 U.S. at 180. Further, the Supreme Court
1276
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close the possibility that a court could impose prior restraints in certain
instances. 37 In determining whether prior restraints were permissible to
protect the trial process, the Court developed a test that focused on the
nature and extent of the news coverage, the possible alternatives to re-
straining the press, and the effectiveness of the restraining order in pro-
tecting a defendant's right to a fair trial. 3 8 The Nebraska Press Court also
recognized that while, in some instances, the publicity surrounding a
trial has led to violations of a defendant's due process rights, such pub-
licity does not invariably lead to an unfair trial.3i) Consequently, the
Court concluded that trial judges were responsible for mitigating the
effects of adverse pretrial publicity.40
In spite of the Supreme Court's decision in Nebraska Press, the ABA
in 1978 drafted a fair trial-free press standard that would prohibit a
judge from restraining the press from publishing information about a
criminal case.4 1 This standard, in fact, was promulgated specifically in
stated that there is a heavy presumption against the validity of prior restraints of
expression, because prior restraints on speech suppress the precise freedom that
the first amendment was designed to protect. Id. at 181. Because the Court set
aside the order on the grounds that it was obtained in an ex parte proceeding,
the Court did not reach the issue of whether an injunction could have been ob-
tained through proper proceedings. Id. at 180.
37. 427 U.S. at 569. The Court did not rule out the possibility that prior
restraint could be used to protect against a threat to a defendant's right to a fair
trial. Id. The Court, however, did not hypothesize as to the type of circum-
stances under which such prior restraint would be permissible. Id. at 569-70.
38. Id. at 562. The Nebraska Press Court stated that the trial court, when
deciding whether to impose a prior restraint on publication, must examine:
"(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures
would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and
(c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened
danger. The precise terms of the restraining order are also important." Id.
In applying the test to the case at bar, the Court found that pervasive pub-
licity, concerning the case was likely, thus it was reasonable to conclude that a
high level of adverse publicity could affect the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id.
at 563-64. The Court concluded, however, that the trial court's record lacked
findings on whether alternative measures could have mitigated the effects of the
publicity. Id. at 563-65. Additionally, the Court noted that there would be sig-
nificant practical problems in enforcing a restraining order. Id. at 569. Impos-
ing a restraining order on the press would not prevent rumors from spreading
throughout the community, creating a greater likelihood that the information
would be inaccurate. Id. at 567.
39. Id. at 554. The Court stated that "pretrial publicity-even pervasive,
adverse publicity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial." Id.
40. Id. at 555. The Court stated that the trial judge has a major responsibil-
ity to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. This includes what the
judge himself says about a trial and what attorneys and police say to encourage
news coverage. Id. In addition, the measures a judge takes, or does not take, to
mitigate the effects of publicity may be determinative of whether the defendant
receives a fair trial. Id.
41. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAlJUSTICE § 8-3.1 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as ABA STANDARDS]. This fair trial-free press standard provides that "[nJo rule
of court or judicial order shall be promulgated that prohibits representatives of
11
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response to the Nebraska Press decision.4 2 The drafters of this fair trial-
free press standard indicated that such a categorical prohibition against
restraining orders was necessary to protect the media's rights. 43
Following Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court discussed the press'
right of access to judicial records in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.44
In Warner Communications, the defendant sought to copy, broadcast, and
sell the Watergate tapes that were admitted into evidence at the trial of
President Richard Nixon's former advisors. 45 The Supreme Court re-
jected Warner Communication's claim that there was a first amendment
right to copy and publish the tapes.4 6 The Court held that the press had
no greater right of access to the tapes under the first amendment than
the public, and that the public has never had such a right of physical
access.
47
the news media from broadcasting or publishing any information in their pos-
session relating to a criminal case." Id.
The Senate's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights also went on the rec-
ord as opposing prior restraints being placed on the media in the free press-fair
trial context. STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH
CONG., 2D SEss., FREE PREss-FAIR TRIAL (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited
as FREE PREss-FAIR TRIAL]. The subcommittee noted the advantages of free
press coverage of a trial and stated that self-policing by the media is a judicious
course. Id. at 8.
42. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 40, at § 8-3.1 historical note.
43. Id. § 8-3.1 comment. This comment recognized that ultimate vindica-
tion through the judicial system means little when the cost of litigation is high
and long delays in publication result. Id. A categorical prohibition against re-
straining orders does not preclude sanctions, however. For example, if informa-
tion is obtained by theft or fraud, the first amendment does not bar appropriate
punishment. Such punishment, however, is to be aimed at the method used to
obtain the information and not at the publication of the information. Id.
44. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
45. Id. at 594. The W4arner Comm unications case involved the Watergate tapes
that had been admitted into evidence in the trial of Nixon's former advisers. Id.
at 591-94. During the trial, those who attended the trial were able to listen to
the tapes. Id. at 594. Transcripts of the tapes were also made and released to
the press. Id. Warner Communications requested permission to copy, broad-
cast, and sell the tapes that were admitted in evidence. Id.
46. Id. at 608-09. The Court perceived this case as a question of physical
access to the tapes. The Court stated:
[Tihe issue presented in this case is not whether the press must be per-
mitted access to public information to which the public is generally
guaranteed access, but whether these copies of the White House
tapes-to which the public has never had physical access-must be made
available for copying.
Id. at 609 (emphasis in original).
The Court noted that reporters were given transcripts of the tapes, which
they were free to publish. Thus, the press was able to publish and utilize the
exhibits that were in evidence as it saw fit. Id.
47. Id. at 609. The Court did not consider the issue in Warner Communica-
tions to be whether the press had a right of access to public information as to
which public access is generally guaranteed. See id. Rather, the question was
whether the press had a greater right of physical access than the public, such
that the Watergate tapes presented as evidence at trial could be copied. Id. The
1278 [Vol. 30: p. 1267
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Following Nebraska Press and Warner Communications, the Supreme
Court in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale48 held that the public had no in-
dependent right of access to a pretrial judicial proceeding. 49 In Gannett,
the defendants were on trial for murder, and the judge excluded the
public and press from a pretrial suppression hearing and prevented
them from receiving an immediate transcript of the hearing. 50 In find-
ing no independent right of access to the trial, the Court stated that
sixth amendment rights to a speedy and public trial were personal to the
accused, and that the sixth amendment did not guarantee any right of
access for the public. 51 While the Court acknowledged the public's in-
terest in open proceedings, it stated that this interest was adequately
Court noted that Warner Communications had made no claim that it was pre-
cluded from publishing and utilizing the information as it saw fit. Id. Further-
more, the members of the media were furnished with transcripts of the tapes,
which they were also free to publish. Id. But in the final analysis, the Court
concluded that the first amendment did not generally grant rights to the press
greater than those rights granted to the general public. Id. It should be noted,
however, that the Court's first amendment analysis in this case was less than two
pages in length and was not the primary focus of the opinion.
48. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
49. Id. at 370-71, 394. When the defense requested that the hearing be
closed, the press, the prosecution, and the trial judge failed to object. Id. at 375.
It was not until the following day that a right of access to the transcript was
asserted by the press. Id. The Supreme Court framed the issue as follows:
The question presented in this case is whether members of the
public have an independent constitutional right to insist upon access to
a pretrial judicial proceeding, even though the accused, the prosecutor,
and the trial judge all have agreed to the closure of that proceeding in
order to assure a fair trial.
Id. at 370-71.
50. Id. at 375. In Gannett, the defendants were charged with murder, rob-
bery, and grand larceny. Gannett's two area newspapers had published reports
that the two defendants had accompanied the murder victim to his boat, where
evidence indicated the victim had been killed. Id. at 371-72. The newspapers
carried several stories covering the apprehension of the defendants by the police
and reports on the suspected motive for the crime. Id. at 372-73. The newspa-
pers also carried the details of the arraignment of the defendants.
Following their arraignment, the defendants moved for the suppression of
statements made to the police and for the suppression of physical evidence.
Upon the request of defense counsel, who argued that the build-up of adverse
publicity jeopardized the defendants' right to a fair trial, the court granted a
motion to exclude the press and public from the suppression hearing. Id. at 376.
When a reporter objected the next day to the closure of the suppression hear-
ing, the trial judge responded that the hearing was concluded and that the deci-
sion on the immediate release of the hearing transcript had been reserved. Id.
Gannett challenged the closure order, which eventually resulted in the appeal
reaching the Supreme Court. Id. at 376-78.
51. Id. at 379-80. The Court stated that the right to a public trial, like other
sixth amendment guarantees, is personal to the accused. Id. The Supreme
Court stated that prior cases have uniformly recognized the tenet that the sixth
amendment guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit of the defendant. Id. at
380-81 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965)).
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protected by the trial participants in the adversarial system. 52 The ma-
jority of the Justices deciding Gannett, however, specifically pointed out
that the Court was not addressing any first amendment issues. 53
In 1980, the Supreme Court held in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia54 that the first amendment implicitly provided protection against
52. Id. at 383. The Court recognized that the public has an independent
interest in the enforcement of sixth amendment guarantees, but concluded that
the existence of such an interest does not create a constitutional right for the
public. 1d. The Court observed that openness in judicial proceedings arguably
improves the quality of testimony, causes trial participants to perform their du-
ties more conscientiously, and gives the public an opportunity to observe the
legal system. Id. Nevertheless, the Court found that the public's interest in the
administration ofjustice was protected by the participants in the litigation. Id.
The four dissenters in Gannett, on the other hand, argued that the sixth and
fourteenth amendments prevented the state from conducting a pretrial suppres-
sion hearing in private without first giving full and fair consideration to the pub-
lic's constitutionally protected interest. Id. at 436 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 392. The Gannett majority noted that the Court need not reach
any first amendment issues in the abstract. Id. Thus, the Court did not decide
whether the press and public had a first amendment right of access in this case.
Id. The Court decided the case on sixth amendment grounds but stated that
even if a first amendment right was involved, the state court showed all neces-
sary deference to any first amendment right. Id. No spectator, nor the one re-
porter at the hearing, objected when the defendant made the motion for closure.
Id. Still, the reporter was given the opportunity to object to the closure at a later
proceeding. Id. At that time, the trial judge found that the probability of preju-
dice outweighed any right of access. Id. at 392-93. Further, the Court noted
that the denial of access was temporary and that a transcript of the hearing was
made available when the danger of prejudicial publicity had passed. Id. at 393.
The press and public then had the opportunity to scrutinize the judicial pro-
ceedings. Id. The Court also concluded that the ban on access was not absolute
since the press had the opportunity to infGrm the public of the details of the
pretrial hearing accurately and completely. Id. Gannett, however, was decided
before the Court recognized a first amendment right of access in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). For a dis-
cussion of Richmond Yewspapers, see infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
[he later Richmond Newspapers decision was criticized for not reconciling its
holding with the holding in Gannett. See BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight:
Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFsTRA L. REV. 311, 321 (1982).
BeVier argues that the plurality opinion in Richmond NVewspapers failed to ade-
quately explain why Gannett was decided on sixth amendment grounds and Rich-
mond Nvewspapers on first amendment grounds. Id. In the plurality opinion in
Richmond .\ewspapers, however, Chief Justice Burger distinguished Gannett be-
cause it involved access to a pretrial suppression hearing and not a trial. 448
U.S. at 564 (plurality opinion).
On the other hand, the Gannett dissenters argued that the sixth amendment
provided protection for the public's right of access; therefore, they did not dis-
cuss the first amendment issue. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 447 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Only Justice Powell, in his concurring
opinion, stated that the press had a first and fourteenth amendment right to be
present at the pretrial hearing. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
54. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion). In Richmond A'ewspapers
the defendant, who was charged with murder, moved for the courtroom to be
closed to the public. The prosecutor did not object, and the judge subsequently
1280 [Vol. 30: p. 1267
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the exclusion of the press from criminal trials. 55 This right of access,
closed the trial. Id. at 559-60. The plaintiff, Richmond Newspapers, then
sought to have the trial opened. Id. at 560. The trial court denied the newspa-
per's motion to vacate the order closing the trial. Id. at 561. The Virginia
Supreme Court denied the newspaper's petition for appeal, but the Supreme
Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to hear the case. Id. at 562-63.
While the Court did hold there was a first amendment right of access, there
was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger wrote the plurality opinion and
was joined by Justices White and Stevens. Id. at 558 (plurality opinion). The
ChiefJustice first reviewed the relevant history which showed that criminal trials
have been presumptively open. Id. at 564-69 (plurality opinion). The plurality
then focused on how an open trial system enhances the fairness and integrity of
the judicial system. Id. at 569-73 (plurality opinion). For a further discussion of
the plurality opinion, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a concurring opinion. In
his concurrence, Justice Brennan focused on the structural role of the first
amendment in finding a right of access to criminal trials. Id. at 587 (Brennan,J.,
concurring). For a further discussion ofJustice Brennan's concurrence, see infra
note 61 and accompanying text.
Justices Stewart and Blackmun also filed concurring opinions. In his con-
currence, Justice Stewart recognized a constitutional right of access to trials,
both criminal and civil, but stated that such access was not absolute. Id. at 599-
600 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Stewart stated that reasonable limi-
tations could be placed on unrestricted access to courtrooms. Id. at 600 (Stew-
art, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun concurred on the basis of his dissenting
opinion in Gannett. For a discussion ofJustice Blackmun's dissent in Gannett, see
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
In a lone dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that neither the first nor sixth
amendment requires review by the Supreme Court when the defendant and
prosecutor consent to a closure order by a judge. Id. at 605 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). Justice Rehnquist argued that the issue was not one of first amend-
ment versus sixth amendment rights, but rather that the question was whether
the Constitution could be read to prevent a state trial judge from ordering clo-
sure of a trial. Id. at 606 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
While it can be said that the Supreme Court in Richmond Vewspapers held
there was a first amendment right to attend criminal trials, commentators have
noted that the absence of a majority opinion and the number of divergent opin-
ions makes it difficult to say much more about the decision with any certainty.
G. Ferner &J. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and
Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415, 420-21 (1981). Although thejudgment
was by a margin of seven to one, the greatest number of Justices joining one
opinion was three. Id. at 421 n.30. Moreover, as a result of the number of
opinions, the decision in Richmond Newspapers lacked a unifying rationale. BeV-
ier, supra note 53, at 313. Furthermore, the number of opinions implies intransi-
gence and an absence of consensus among members of the Court concerning
the access question. Id.
55. 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated that "the right
to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment;
without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for cen-
turies, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscer-
ated." Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan wrote
that "[t]he instant case raises the question whether the First Amendment, of its
own force and as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
secures the public an independent right of access to trial proceedings .... [t]he
First Amendment secures such a public right of access .... Id. at 584-85 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart likewise found such a right exists: "[T]he
15
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however, was not deemed to be absolute; the Court concluded that rea-
sonable limitations could be imposed on the media's right of access.5"
In its plurality opinion, the Court first focused on the fact that criminal
trials were historically open.5 7 The plurality then found an implicit right
First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of
access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal." Id. at 599 (StewartJ., con-
curring) (footnote omitted).
While Justice Blackmun focused much of his concurring opinion on a sixth
amendment analysis, he stated that "with the Sixth Amendment set to one side
in this case, I am driven to conclude, as a secondary position, that the First
Amendment must provide some measure of protection for public access to the
trial." Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
While the Richmond Newspapers Court recognized a right of access to criminal
trials, the Supreme Court has also discussed right of access questions in other
contexts. Arguably, the Supreme Court has decided two lines of access cases.
See Note, Public Trials and a First Amendment Right of Access: A Presumption of Open-
ness, 60 NEB. L. REV. 169, 172-73 (1981). One line of cases consists of those
decisions that involve a conflict between the sixth and first amendments, in other
words, the fair trial-free press conflict. Id. at 172. The other line discusses the
public right of access to governmental institutions such as prisons, and to infor-
mation. Id. at 173. Richmond Newspapers and Gannett posed a question of access
to governmental information within the fair trial-free press conflict. Id. at 183-
86. See also Comment, Is the Right of Access to Trials an Instance of a First Amendment
Right to Know? Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 831 (1981)
(framing question of access in terms of whether there is a constitutional guaran-
tee that government information be available to public).
56. 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion). Although the plurality noted
that its holding did not mean that the first amendment rights were absolute, the
Court did not define the circumstances under which a trial could be closed to the
public. Id. The plurality stated that while a judge may impose reasonable limita-
tions on access to a trial, he may not exert control to deny or unwarrantedly
abridge opportunities for the communication of thought. Id. (citing Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)). For example, seating at trials is limited
and not all those who would like to attend have the opportunity to attend the
trial. In this type of situation, a court can impose reasonable restrictions on
access. Id.
57. Id. at 563-75 (plurality opinion). In the plurality opinion, ChiefJustice
Burger traced the history of criminal trials to their early roots and found that the
public character of criminal trials remained constant. Nothing in the review of
the history of criminal trials, ChiefJustice Burger wrote, suggested that the pre-
sumptive openness of the trial was not also an attribute of the judicial systems in
colonial America. Id. at 567 (plurality opinion). Justice Burger stated that "the
historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic
laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been pre-
sumptively open. This is no quirk of history; rather, it has long been recognized
as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial." Id. at 569 (plurality
opinion).
Furthermore, ChiefJustice Burger argued that the history of open trials re-
flects the idea that public trials serve a significant therapeutic value. Id. at 570
(plurality opinion). For example, when a shocking crime occurs, an open trial
provides an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. Id. at 571
(plurality opinion). For the justice system to work effectively, ChiefJustice Bur-
ger argued, the system must satisfy the appearance ofjustice, which is best pro-
vided by allowing people to observe the judicial process. Id. at 571-72 (plurality
opinion) (citations omitted). Finally, Chief Justice Burger concluded that this
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of access in the first amendment guarantees of free press, free speech,
and the right of assembly. 58 The right to publish what takes place at a
trial, the plurality concluded, would lose meaning if the press was de-
nied access to a trial.5 9 While the Court in Richmond Newspapers specifi-
cally granted access to attend only criminal trials, the plurality noted
that civil trials, as well as criminal trials, are presumptively open to the
public and press. 60 In a concurring opinion,Justice Brennan also found
uncontradicted history implied that a presumption of openness inheres in the
very nature of a criminal trial. Id. at 573 (plurality opinion).
One commentator has argued that ChiefJustice Burger derived the right of
access from a presumption of openness that was inferred from historical prac-
tice. BeVier, supra note 53, at 325. Professor BeVier criticized Chief Justice
Burger's opinion because the opinion merely invoked history and did not pro-
vide any reason why historical practice was an appropriate source of a constitu-
tional right. Id. The opinion, she argued, delineated the relationship between a
presumption of openness and a constitutional command of openness. Id. Fur-
thermore, the historical analysis in the opinion affirmed the virtues of openness
rather than affirming the relevance of the history itself. Id.
58. 448 U.S. at 577 (plurality opinion). The plurality noted that the right of
access was guaranteed by an amalgam of the first amendment rights of speech
and press. Id. Additionally, the Court found the right of assembly relevant be-
cause it served as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of other first amend-
ment guarantees, in addition to being regarded as an independent right. Id.
The plurality further stated that the first amendment, taken in conjunction with
the fourteenth amendment, was written to prevent the abridging of the rights of
free press, free speech, and free assembly. Id. at 575 (plurality opinion). These
freedoms, when taken together, ensured the free communication of information
concerning governmental functions. The plurality found that the manner in
which criminal trials were conducted was an aspect of government that was of
great concern and importance to the people. Id.
59. Id. at 576-77 (plurality opinion). The plurality noted that the right to
attend trials was a right exercised by the public less frequently today, because
much of the information concerning trials reaches the public through the media.
Id. at 577 n.12 (plurality opinion). The plurality stated, however, that this did
not alter the right. Id.
60. Id. at 577 & n.12 (plurality opinion). The issue of whether there was a
right of access to civil trials was not raised in Richmond Newspapers. The plurality
noted, however, that historically civil trials, as well as criminal trials, were pre-
sumptively open to the public. Id. at 578 (plurality opinion). In addition,Justice
Stewart stated in his concurrence that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments
clearly give the press and the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as
well as criminal." Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
The Third Circuit recently held that there is also a constitutional right of
access to civil trials. Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984),
noted in the Third Circuit Review, 30 VILL. L. REV. 980 (1985). In Publicker,
which involved a proxy fight, a motion was made to close the courtroom because
of the sensitive nature of the information involved. In essence, the issue in the
case was whether certain information should be released. 733 F.2d at 1063.
The Third Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions in Richmond Vewspa-
pers and Globe Newspaper and noted that two factors were important in a finding of
a right of access to criminal trials: a historical presumption of openness and the
role of access in guarding the integrity and fairness of the judicial process. Id. at
1067-74 (citations omitted). The court concluded that these features of the
criminal justice system also characterize the civil justice system. Id. at 1070. The
court stated that civil proceedings have been historically open and that both the
17
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a right of access, but based the finding on the structural role the first
amendment plays in maintaining America's republican form of govern-
public and the judicial system benefit from the openness of civil trials. Id. at
1068-70. The court stated, however, that the right of access was not absolute,
but rather the burden would be on the moving party to justify the closure. Id. at
1070-71.
Commentators have also argued that the constitutional right of access to
trials applies to civil trials as well as criminal trials. See Ferner & Koley, supra
note 54, at 430-32. Ferner and Koley argue that the Richmond Newspapers deci-
sion supports the conclusion that the right of access applies to civil trials. Id. at
430. As Ferner and Koley noted, the three-Justice plurality noted that civil trials
have also been presumptively open and Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, spe-
cifically stated that there was a constitutional right of access to trials, both civil
and criminal. Id. Furthermore, the authors argued that Justice Brennan's struc-
tural approach to the resolution of fair trial-free press questions supported the
extension of the right of access to civil trials. Id. at 430. For a discussion of
Justice Brennan's structural approach, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
Justice Powell's approach regarding constitutional protection for access to infor-
mation about governmental affairs would also provide some measure of protec-
tion for access to civil proceedings. Id. at 430-31 (citing Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850-75 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
Another commentator has argued that there were two basic reasons why the
Supreme Court found a right of access to criminal trials-the historical pre-
sumption of openness and the role access plays in the proper functioning of the
judicial process, which would extend a right of access to civil trials as well. See
Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 286, 290 (1984). The reasoning applied in
finding a right of access to criminal trials would also lead to the conclusion that
there was a right of access to civil trials. Historically, civil trials have also been
open to the public. See id. at 294-96. Until the tenth century there was no dis-
tinction of treatment between civil and criminal matters. Id. at 294. When a
distinction was made between criminal and civil procedure, public attendance at
trial did not seem to be one of the distinctions. Id. at 295. Early commentators,
therefore, expressly or implicitly recognized that civil trials were open to the
public. Id. Today, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that civil trials
take place in open court and that the testimony of witnesses be taken in open
court. Id. at 296 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 77(b), 43(a)).
In addition to civil trials being historically open, this commentator argued
that there are important public interests to be served by public attendance at
civil trials. Id. at 297-98. Arguably, open civil trials protect the goals of in-
formed public discussion and self-government, goals enunciated in Globe Neu,spa-
per. Id. at 297 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-06). Many civil suits
concern the vindication of constitutional and statutory policies, and civil suits
often involve issues such as school desegregation, prison reform, environmental
pollution, and corporate misconduct. Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, civil
suits concern the functioning of the government and because over half the fed-
eral and state courts' caseload is civil, to deprive access to civil trials would de-
prive the public of the opportunity to scrutinize much of thejudicial process. Id.
at 298.
Although there is a strong argument that a constitutional right of access to
civil trials exists, some states that allow cameras in their courtrooms distinguish
access to trials on the basis of whether the trial is civil or criminal. See generally
Denniston, Cameras in the Courtroom 1982, QUILL, March 1982, at 24-25. Still,
coverage of civil trials, which often are of less interest to the media, is allowed
only slightly more often than coverage of criminal trials. Id. at 22.
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ment. 1 Due to the divergence of the theories relied upon by the plural-
ity and Justice Brennan, the scope of the right of access recognized in
Richmond Newspapers was unclear.6 2 The Court, however, later recog-
nized that the guarantee of open proceedings included access to voir
dire examination of potential jurors in a criminal case.63
61. 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan began with
the proposition that previous Supreme Court decisions must be read to hold
that any privilege of access to governmental information is subject to restraint to
the degree dictated by the nature of the information and the countervailing in-
terests in security and confidentiality. Id. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted). Thus, Justice Brennan argued that these cases simply reflected
the special nature of a claim of a first amendment right to gather information.
Id. In addressing the structural role that the first amendment plays, Justice
Brennan wrote:
[T]he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free ex-
pression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of
self-government. . . . Implicit in this structural role is not only "the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open," New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964), but also the antecedent assumption that valuable public de-
bate-as well as other civic behavior-must be informed, The struc-
tural model links the First Amendment to that process of
communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails
solicitude not only for communication itself, but also for the indispen-
sable conditions of meaningful communication.
Id. at 587-88 (Brennan,J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citation and foot-
notes omitted). Because this reasoning could extend protection of public access
to unworkable extremes, Justice Brennan wrote that the structural analysis must
be invoked with discrimination and temperance. Id. at 588 (Brennan,J., concur-
ring). Justice Brennan articulated two guiding principles: First, the case for ac-
cess has special force when it is drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of
public entry to particular proceedings or information. Second, the value of ac-
cess must be measured in specifics; in other words, the analysis should focus on
whether access to particular government process is important in terms of that
process. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan then stated that history and previous Supreme Court deci-
sions indicated the public character of the trial process. Id. at 589-93 (Brennan,
J., concurring). He noted that open trials play a fundamental role in furthering
the efforts of the judicial system to assure criminal defendants a fair trial. Id. at
593 (Brennan, J., concurring). By playing a pivotal role in the judicial process,
access, by extension, plays a pivotal role in the form of government. Id. at 595
(Brennan, J., concurring). On the basis of these factors, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the balance was tipped strongly in favor of the rule that trials be
open. Id. at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. For a discussion of the limited nature of the Richmond NVewspapers hold-
ing, see supra note 54.
63. Press-Enterprise & Co. v. Superior Court of Cal,, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
In this case, Press-Enterprise moved that the voir dire examination of jurors in
the trial of a man charged with raping and murdering a teenage girl be open to
the public. Id. at 503. While the voir dire lasted six weeks, only three days of the
proceedings were open to the public. Id. The Court first recognized the impor-
tance of the jury selection process to the criminal justice system. Id. at 505.
Next, the Court traced the development of the jury selection process and found
that historically it had been presumptively open. Id. at 505-08. In addition, the
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The Supreme Court, however, further defined its Richmond Newspa-
pers decision in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court."4 In Globe Newspaper,
the Court reviewed a Massachusetts law that prohibited access to trials
during the testimony of a minor who was the victim of a sexual of-
fense. 6 5 The Court held that this mandatory closure rule violated the
first amendment." 6 Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion,
cited two basic reasons why the right of public access to criminal trials is
protected by the first amendment. First, criminal trials historically have
been open to the public and, over time, this presumption of openness
has remained secure. 6 7 Second, public access to criminal trials plays an
important role in the proper functioning of the judicial and governmen-
tal processes. 68
The Globe Newspaper Court reiterated that while the right of access is
constitutionally guaranteed, it is not an absolute right.6 'J Still, to suc-
cessfully exclude the public and press from a trial, the Court held that
the state must show a compelling governmental interest.0 In addition,
an order preventing access must be narrowly drawn to serve this corn-
Court recognized the important role open trials play in assuring fairness in the
criminal justice system. Id. at 508. While closed proceedings are not absolutely
precluded, the Court found that closed proceedings must be rare and occur only
when the cause shown outweighs the value of openness. Id. at 509. The trial
court must consider alternatives to closure; otherwise the voir dire proceeding
may not be constitutionally closed. Id. at 511.
64. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
65. Id. at 598. The Massachusetts law required trial judges to exclude the
press and public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of
certain sexual offenses. Id.
66. Id. at 610-11 & 611 n.27. The Globe Newspaper Court limited its holding
to the confines of the case, holding that "a rule of mandatory closure respecting
the testimony of minor sex victims is constitutionally infirm." Id. at 611 n.27.
Still, the Court noted that such closure may be appropriate in individual cases.
Id.
67. Id. at 602. The Court stated: "This uniform rule of openness has been
viewed as significant in constitutional terms not only 'because the Constitution
carries the gloss of history,' but also because 'a tradition of accessibility implies
the favorable judgment of experience.' " Id. at 605 (quoting Richmond Nvewspa-
pers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan,J., concurring)). Further, the Court noted that it
was unable to find any United States case in which criminal proceedings were
held in camera. Id. For a discussion of why the Massachusetts statute was found
unconstitutional, see i'fra note 72 and accompanying text.
68. 457 U.S. at 605. The Court recognized that access to trials allows for
public scrutiny of thejudicial process, which in turn enhances the integrity of the
fact-finding process. Thus, access benefits both the defendant and the public.
Id. In addition, the Court concluded that open trials result in an appearance of
fairness that increases the public's respect for the judicial process. Id.
69. Id. at 606 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality
opinion)). For a discussion of this portion of the Richmond Newspapers opinion,
see supra note 55.
70. 457 U.S. at 606-07. One commentator has suggested several interests
that arguably are compelling. Note, supra note 55, at 299-3 10. These interests
would include the protection of national security interests, protection of trade
secrets, protection of juveniles, and protection of personal privacy. Id.
1286 [Vol. 30: p. 1267
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pelling governmental interest.7 1 Although the Court found that the
state's interest in protecting minors was a compelling one, the Court
held that the mandatory closure rule did not constitutionally deny access
because the statute was not narrowly tailored to meet the state's
interest. 7
2
In the Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper decisions, the
Supreme Court recognized that restrictions on access which resemble
time, place, and manner restrictions would not be subject to the same
strict scrutiny as would restrictions that completely banned access. 73 On
71. 457 U.S. at 606-07. The Court stated:
[T]he circumstances under which the press and public can be barred
from a criminal trial are limited; the State's justification in denying ac-
cess must be a weighty one. Where, as in the present case, the State
attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
ChiefJustice Burger in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued that the Court's decision grossly invaded Massachusetts' state authority.
Id. at 612-13 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In addition, the dissenters argued that
the media was not denied access to the information about what took place at the
trial, rather the media was only prevented from witnessing the testimony. Id. at
615 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 610-11. The state asserted that it had interests both in protecting
minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and in encouraging such victims
to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner. Id. at 607. While
the Court found the interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of a minor to be a compelling one, it also found that a mandatory closure
rule was not justified. Id. at 607-08. A decision on closure should be made on a
case by case basis, the Court concluded, since the significance of the interest
may vary in particular cases. Id. at 608. As to the state's second stated interest,
encouraging victims to testify truthfully, the Court found that the state had pro-
vided no empirical evidence that a mandatory closure rule would encourage mi-
nor victims to come forward to testify. Id. at 609. The Court further reasoned
that the interest in encouraging victims to come forward could not be limited to
minor victims of sex crimes. Thus, the Court concluded that Massachusetts' ar-
gument based on this interest was overbroad, running contrary to the presump-
tion of openness in criminal trials. Id. at 610.
73. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607 n. 17 (limitations on right of access
that resemble time, place, and manner restrictions are not subject to same strict
scrutiny as when access is completely denied); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
581 n.18 (plurality opinion) (just as government may impose reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on use of streets for free flow of traffic, trial
judges, in the fair administration of justice, may impose reasonable limitations
on access to trial; this would include limitations on seating); id. at 600 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (just as legislature may impose reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restrictions upon exercise of first amendment freedoms, trial judges may
impose reasonable limitations upon unrestricted occupation of courtroom).
Ferner and Koley have also recognized the necessity of reasonable controls
unrelated to the content of the proceeding. Ferner & Koley, supra note 54, at
444. They suggest that such restrictions would allow preferential access tojudi-
cial proceedings for the media, screening of spectators for weapons, and reason-
able restrictions on access to exhibits if unrelated to the content or substance of
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previous occasions, the Court stated that reasonable regulation of the
time, place, or manner of protected speech was permitted under the first
amendment when the regulations were necessary to further significant
governmental interests.7 4 Such time, place, and manner restrictions,
however, may not be based on the subject matter or content of the
speech 75  and must leave ample alternative channels for
communication. 76
the exhibit. Id. at 444-46. The authors point out, however, that while such de-
nial of access might be justified, such a restriction is not the same as being able
to prevent the publication of information once it is known. Id. at 446.
For a discussion of the application of a time, place, and manner analysis to a
case involving the access of cameras to a courtroom, see infra notes 86-88 and
accompanying text.
74. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 426 U.S. 50, 64 n.18 (1976)
(citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (limitation on use of sound trucks),
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (ban on demonstrations in or near court-
house with intent to obstruct justice), Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972) (ban on willful noisemaking near school that disturbs order of school
session)).
In Young, the city of Detroit had adopted a zoning ordinance that differenti-
ated between motion picture theaters that showed sexually explicit films and
theaters that did not show such movies. 426 U.S. at 53. In effect, the zoning
ordinance required that the adult theaters be dispersed. Id. In finding the zon-
ing ordinance valid, the Court held that the regulation of location of adult film
theaters did not offend the first amendment. Id. at 64.
75. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065
(1984).
76. Id. at 3069. In Clark, the Supreme Court considered whether a National
Park Service regulation, which prohibited camping in certain parks, violated the
first amendment when it was used to prohibit demonstrators from camping over-
night at a Washington, D.C., park. Id. at 3067. This demonstration was in-
tended to call attention to the plight of the homeless. Id. at 3068. The Park
Service gave permission for a demonstration in the park, but had denied permis-
sion for the demonstrators to camp overnight in the park. Id.
The Court stated that restrictions of the type at issue in Clark are valid when
they (1) are made without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
(2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
(3) leave open alternative channels for communication of the information. Id. at
3069 (citing City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Heffron v. International Soc'v for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Ser-
vice Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)).
The Court concluded that the Park Service regulation was a time, place, and
manner regulation. 104 S. Ct. at 3069. Because the Park Service allowed the
demonstration, but did not permit the demonstrators to camp, the regulation
was directed only at the manner of the demonstration. Id. The Court also con-
cluded that the regulation was content neutral, because there was no argument
that the prohibition against camping was directed at the content of the demon-
strators' speech. Id. at 3070. Furthermore, the regulation narrowly focused on
the Government's substantial interest in maintaining national parks. Id. While
the Court assumed that actually camping at the park would involve an element
of expression, its major function with respect to the planned demonstration
would be facilitative; i.e., those who were actually homeless would be en-
1288
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III. THE CONTINUING BAN OF CAMERAS FROM FEDERAL COURTROOMS
The Supreme Court's analysis of the media's first amendment right
of access to criminal trials raises the question of whether a total ban of
cameras from federal courtrooms violates the Constitution. 77 The Elev-
enth Circuit in Hastings v. United States78 recently discussed the absolute
ban of cameras from federal courtrooms. 79 In Hastings, a news organiza-
couraged to come to the park to sleep. Id. The Court also rejected the argu-
ment that there was a less restrictive alternative because of the threat of damage
to the park by allowing people to camp overnight on park land. Id. at 3072.
Similarly, in Consolidated Edison, the issue was whether the first amendment
was violated by an order of the Public Service Commission of New York (Com-
mission) that prohibited Consolidated Edison from including inserts, which dis-
cussed controversial issues, in monthly electric bills. 447 U.S. at 533.
Consolidated Edison had placed bill inserts that expressed its view on the bene-
fits of nuclear power. Id. In the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell stated that
one determination the Court had to make was whether the prohibition was a
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction. Id. at 536. In reviewing this ques-
tion, the Court presented an overview of cases that have fleshed out the time,
place, and manner analysis.
The Court first recognized that reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tions are valid if they serve a significant government interest and leave ample
alternative channels for communication. Id. (citing Linmark Assocs. v. Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).
The Court also noted that a restriction that regulates only time, place, or man-
ner may be imposed if it is reasonable, but if the regulation is based on the
content of the speech the governmental action must be scrutinized more care-
fully. Id. at 537. Because governmental action that regulates content is not neu-
tral, a permissible time, place, and manner regulation may not be based on the
content or subject matter of the speech. Id. (citations omitted). In Consolidated
Edison, the Commission admitted that its actions were related to the content of
the inserts. Thus, the prohibition could not be upheld as a valid time, place, and
manner restriction. Id. at 538.
77. For a discussion of the media's first amendment right of access, see
supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
78. 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2094 (1983). The de-
fendant Hastings, a federal judge, was indicted for conspiracy and obstruction of
justice. 695 F.2d at 1279 n.6. This indictment accused Hastings of accepting a
bribe from an undercover agent posing as a criminal defendant. Id. Hastings
favored televising the trial, arguing that it would serve to restore his reputation.
Id.
79. In addition to Hastings, two other circuit courts have faced similar ques-
tions. See United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 747 F.2d Ill (2d Cir. 1984). For a discussion of Ker/ev,
see infia notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
In lVonkers Board, a newspaper reporter sought to bring a tape recorder into
a federal courtroom. 747 F.2d at 112. Under a local federal court rule, cassette
recorders were not allowed in the courtroom. Id. In its opinion, the appellate
court argued that Supreme Court decisions limited the right of access to trials to
physical presence. Id. at 113. Because the local rule did not prevent the re-
porter's right of access and did not prohibit him from communicating what he
observed to his readers, the rule was a time, place, and manner restriction that
was to be upheld if it was reasonable. Id. at 114. The Second Circuit found that
the rule was reasonable because witnesses could be distracted by the presence of
a tape recorder and tape recorders would also detract from the dignity of the
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tion sought to televise a trial in federal court, and the criminal defendant
also requested that the court permit coverage of the trial. 80 In refusing
to open the trial to television cameras, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
television station's first amendment challenge to the federal court sys-
tem's total ban on cameras in the courtroom. 8' While indicating that
television coverage of courtroom proceedings was not constitutionally
prohibited, the Hastings court stated that this did not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that television coverage was constitutionally mandated.
8 2
Because the television station asserted a first amendment right to record
and broadcast the trial, the court found the television station's request
to televise the trial more analogous to the request for the Watergate
tapes in Warner Communications than to the media's request for access in
Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper.83
courtroom. Id. In addition, allowing indiscriminate recording of trials could un-
dermine the official reporting system. Id. Thus, the rule was found to be consti-
tutional. Id.
80. 695 F.2d at 1279. In Hastings, the defendant moved to allow the trial to
be televised. Id. Post-Newsweek Stations, which represented the interests of
several news organizations, filed a motion to intervene. Id. at 1280. The district
court denied both of these motions. Post-Newsweek then filed a motion with the
circuit court for an expedited appeal, and the court granted the motion. Id. The
defendant did not join the appeal but did file an amicus brief. Id.
81. Id. at 1284. The Hastings court reasoned that the use of cameras in fed-
eral courtrooms should not be fixed in "constitutional concrete," but should
instead be addressed through rulemaking authority. Id. The court concluded
that first amendment concerns would be advanced only minimally by allowing
media access. On the other hand, the institutional interests in protecting the
trial process would be served by regulating cameras in the courtroom through
the courts' rulemaking authority. Id.
82. Id. at 1280. The court interpreted recent Supreme Court decisions as
holding that television coverage of a criminal trial is not inherently unconstitu-
tional because a defendant's right to due process is not necessarily violated by
the presence of cameras in the courtroom. Id. (citing Chandler, 449 U.S. at 574-
81). The court stated that although Supreme Court rulings stand for the propo-
sition that the press has a right of access to observe criminal trials, such rulings
are not dispositive of the issue of whether cameras must be permitted in federal
courts. Id. (citing Globe Vewspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-11; Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 579-81).
83. Id. at 1281. In lWarner Communications, the request had been to copy and
publish tape recordings that had been admitted into evidence. In Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, the press sought the right to attend judicial pro-
ceedings that had been closed to both the press and the public. The Hastings
court concluded that a request to televise a trial more closely approximated the
request in lWarner Communications. Id. For a discussion distinguishing the request
in Hastings from the request in Globe Newspaper, see infra note 129 and accompa-
nying text.
It is important, however, to recognize two aspects of the Supreme Court's
decision in Warner Communications. First, it was decided in 1978, before the Rich-
miond Newspapers decision. 435 U.S. at 589. Second, the Court viewed 1l'arn er
Communications as involving access to judicial records, rather than access to the
proceedings themselves. Id. at 591-609. For a discussion of W1'arner Commniica-
lions, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Richmond
Newspapers, see supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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The Hastings court also sought to distinguish the Supreme Court's
decision in Globe Newspaper, which held that a per se exclusion of the
public violates the first amendment. 8 4 While the local court rules for all
federal district and circuit courts prohibit access of cameras to the court-
room, 8 5 the Hastings court concluded that this exclusion does not fore-
close public scrutiny of the trial in any way, unlike a rule that completely
closes a trial during a victim's testimony, as did the rule in Globe Newspa-
per.8 c6 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held that the federal courts' per
se exclusion of cameras is a reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tion.8 7 The court reasoned that the per se exclusion is a reasonable re-
striction because the additional benefit of allowing cameras in the
courtroom would advance first amendment concerns only minimally,
while judicial economy and efficiency are served significantly by the per
se exclusion. 88
84. For a discussion of Globe Newspaper, see supra notes 64-72 and accompa-
nying text.
85. For a discussion of the local federal court rules, see supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
86. 695 F.2d at 1281. The Eleventh Circuit stated that the rules which ban
cameras from federal courtrooms are significantly different than the state statute
that was challenged in Globe Newspaper. Id. In Globe Newspaper, the Massachusetts
statute permitted the courtroom to be closed during a minor victim's testimony
at a sex offender's trial. 457 U.S. at 598. At the trial of a sex offender, the
victim's testimony is likely to be the most critical evidence presented at the trial,
and under the Massachusetts statute, it would be obscured from public view.
Hastings, 695 F.2d at 1281. The Hastings court reasoned, however, that with the
ban against cameras in the courtroom, public scrutiny of the trial, or any portion
of the trial, would not be foreclosed. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit did not take note that, under the circumstances in
Globe NVewspaper, the press could have gained access to the record, although they
could not be present during the testimony. See 457 U.S. at 615 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
87. 695 F.2d at 1282. The Hastings court found that the federal rules ban-
ning cameras in federal courtrooms were merely a restriction on the manner of
the media's news gathering activities, since the press was able to attend the trial
and report on what occurred. Id. Thus, the Hastings court concluded that a strict
scrutiny standard was not applicable. Id. Rather, the court stated that the
proper standard for determining the reasonableness of such a restriction was
whether the restriction promoted a significant governmental interest without
unwarrantedly abridging communication of thought. Id.
88. Id. After determining the applicable standard of review, the court dis-
cussed the competing interests to be weighed. Id. at 1282. In this particular
case there was no fear of harming the defendant's right to a fair trial since the
defendant expressly waived any such objections. Id. at 1283. The defendant
Hastings had requested that the court permit the trial to be televised. Id. at
1279.
The court noted that there are two institutional considerations that support
the ban of cameras from federal courtrooms. First, there is an institutional in-
terest in preserving order and decorum in the court. Second, there is an interest
in procedures designed to ensure a fair trial and increase the truth-seeking func-
tion of a trial. Id. at 1283.
The court also listed the factors favoring media coverage of trials. Id. First,
the right of access fosters public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
19851 NOTE 1291
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The Seventh Circuit reached a result similar to that of the Hastings
court in United States v. Kerley.8 9 In Kerley, the defendant sought to pho-
tograph and broadcast his court proceedings. After finding that such
coverage was prohibited by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,"',
the Kerley court turned to the first and sixth amendment questions
presented in the case. The court found that the sixth amendment right
to a public trial did not guarantee the defendant the right to broadcast
his trial.' Additionally, in discussing the first amendment considera-
tions, the court found that the ban of cameras from federal courtrooms
was a time, place, and manner regulation.9 2 The court found that the
restriction on the access of cameras represented a limitation on access
rather than a denial of access.9 3 Because the interests in denying access
outweighed the marginal gains of allowing access, the rule against cam-
eras in the courtroom was not unreasonable. 94
system. Second, public access allows the public to act as a check on potential
abuses of the judicial system. Third, the right of access promotes the truth-
seeking function of a trial. Id. (citations omitted). The court commented, how-
ever, that allowing the media a different form of access-the use of cameras-
would not add measurably to the public's confidence in the judicial system. Id.
The court stated that access of cameras would not aid in the truth-seeking pro-
cess, but rather would likely have an adverse impact because of its effect on ju-
rors and witnesses, Id. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that access
of cameras would advance first amendment concerns only minimally. Id. at
1283. The court also found that the per se rule against cameras in the court-
room was reasonable. Id. Because the infringement on first amendment rights
was minimal or nonexistent, the court found that judicial economy and efficiency
were served by a per se rule. Id.
89. 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1984).
90. Id. at 617. In Kerlev, the defendant was indicted for failing to register
for the draft. The defendant filed a pretrial motion requesting permission to
photograph, record, and broadcast the court proceedings. Id. The motion was
denied pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
bans cameras from federal courtrooms. Id. at 618.
91. Id. at 620. The court stated that the Supreme Court has expressly re-
jected such an extension of sixth amendment rights. Id. (citing Warner Communi-
cations, 435 U.S. at 610). For a discussion of Warner Communications, see supra
notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
92. 753 F.2d at 620. In its analysis of first amendment rights, the court
cited the rationale of the Hastings court. The court stated that because the re-
strictions at issue regulated only the time, place, and manner of newsgathering
activities, they would be upheld if they were neutral and reasonable. Id. Thus,
the court focused its inquiry on whether rule 53 unwarrantedly abridged the
opportunities for communication of thought. Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 620-21. Consequently, the limitation on access was not subject to
the same strict scrutiny as a denial of access. Id. at 620.
94. Id. at 621-22. While there were benefits in broad access to trials, the
court stated that the marginal gains resulting from allowing cameras into an al-
ready public trial did not outweigh the risks and uncertainties associated with
allowing cameras in the courtroom. Id. at 621. There are also potential distrac-
tions and interests in judicial decorum threatened by cameras in the courtroom.
Id. at 622. Thus, the nondiscretionary prohibition of cameras was not unreason-
able. Id.
1292 [Vol. 30: p. 1267
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The Second Circuit also wrestled with the issue of cameras in fed-
eral courtrooms in Westmoreland v. CBS.9 5 In Westmoreland, the Cable
News Network sought to televise the courtroom proceedings9 6 of the
libel suit General William Westmoreland brought against CBS for
charges made on the news show Sixty Minutes.9 7 In discussing the first
amendment issues implicated in the request to televise the trial, the
court recognized the first amendment right of access to trials. 98 The
court stated, however, that it was unprepared to take the leap from the
constitutional right of access to a finding that a right to televise trials
exists under the first amendment. 9 9 Although the court found that a
95. 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3882 (U.S.June 17,
1985) (No. 84-1377).
96. 752 F.2d at 17. The court framed the issue presented by Cable News
Network by stating:
This case presents the novel question whether a cable news net-
work has a right to televise a federal trial and the public a right to view
that trial-where the court is adjudicating a civil action, where both
parties have consented to the presence of television cameras in the
courtroom under the close supervision of a willing court, but where a
facially applicable court rule prohibits the presence of such cameras.
Id.
The Cable News Network argued that because of the extraordinary nature
of the Westmoreland trial, the application of a rule prohibiting television cover-
age was beyond the powers of the court and a violation of both the network's
and the public's first amendment rights. Id. The news organization further as-
serted that the issues of the trial were of particular importance
because the substantive issues in Westmoreland implicitly mirror the in-
stitutional tensions raised before this court-in Westmoreland, one party
seeks redress of injury flowing from statements asserting that the Gov-
ernment withheld information from the public in order to insulate the
Government from public scrutiny; while the other party, seeking to de-
fend the integrity of those statements, implicitly defends the integrity of
the medium through which those statements were made.
Id.
97. See Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (S.D.N.Y.). One
allegation at issue was whether officers high in the United States military com-
mand had willfully distorted intelligence data to substantiate optimistic reports
about the progress of the Vietnam war. Id.
98. 752 F.2d at 22. The Second Circuit noted that this right of access
under the first amendment is based on the understanding that "a major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."
Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). The court further rec-
ognized that public access to civil trials is secured by the first amendment since
such access "enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding
process." Id. at 23 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606). However, the
court rejected the argument that the right to access includes the right to tele-
vised trials. Id. The Second Circuit noted that "no case ... has [ever] held that
the public has a right to televised trials." Id. at 22.
99. Id. at 23. The court stated:
There is a long leap, however, between a public right under the
First Amendment to attend trials and a public right under the First
Amendment to see a given trial televised. It is a leap that is not sup-
ported by history. It is a leap that we are not yet prepared to take.
Id. In support of its conclusion, the court cited a finding of an ad hoc committee
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right to televise trials does not currently exist, it stated that when judi-
cial concerns with the difficulties of televising a trial are diminished, the
presumption may shift in favor of allowing television coverage.10 0
While the federal courts maintain a total ban against cameras in the
courtroom, a majority of the state judicial systems allow cameras in their
courtrooms, although not under a constitutional mandate. Approxi-
mately forty states allow television coverage, but the types of coverage
allowed varies from state to state.' 0l Frequently, when a state begins to
of the Judicial Conference ... that the risks to the administration ofjustice out-
weighed the benefits of changing the rules currently governing media coverage
of federal proceedings. Id. at 23 n.10 (citing REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM 3 (Sept. 6, 1984)).
The court admitted, however, that at some point in the future the presumption
might be in favor of allowing cameras in the courtrooms. Id. at 23. For a further
discussion of this issue, see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
Although the majority touched upon the first amendment implications of its
decision, these implications were more fully discussed in the concurrence by
Judge Winter. Judge Winter concurred in the result in Westmoreland, but dis-
agreed with the rationale of the majority opinion. 752 F.2d at 24 (Winter, J.,
concurring). Judge Winter found that the first amendment is implicated in a
request to televise a trial, but that the rule prohibiting cameras in federal court
was a valid time, place, and manner restriction. Id. at 24-25 (Winter, J., concur-
ring). Judge Winter rejected the Cable News Network's contention that a per se
rule banning cameras in the courtroom was unconstitutional because of his con-
cern that workable standards could not be created to allow for a case-by-case
determination. Id. at 25 (Winter, J., concurring). Furthermore, he stated that a
per se rule is a justifiable time, place, and manner restriction notwithstanding
uncertainty that a case-by-case approach would be unworkable; it is enough that
there is a reasonable belief that the potentially undesirable effects of television
cannot be detected on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 26 (Winter, J., concurring).
100. 752 F.2d at 23. The court stated that after experimentation with cam-
eras in courtrooms, a time may come when concerns with the expenditure of
judicial time on administration, with the potentially adverse effects on jurors and
witness, and with retaining courtroom dignity are secondary or irrelevant. Id. If
such a time comes, the court stated that the presumption may be that all trials
should be televised. Id. The court thus found that until the first amendment
expands to include television access to courtrooms, the right to televise federal
trials is created by the consent of the judiciary. Id. at 24.
It is submitted that the Westmoreland court premised its first amendment
analysis on the finding that television coverage is disruptive to courtroom pro-
ceedings. For a discussion of the court's findings in this regard, see supra note
99 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit thereby avoided a discussion of
whether television access itself is constitutionally protected, and merely con-
cluded that for the present time judicial concerns override the interests served
by allowing television coverage of trials.
101. See Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
In Westmoreland, the district court cited a statistic, provided by Cable News Net-
work, which indicated that 41 states allow television coverage of courtroom pro-
ceedings in some form. Id. See also Denniston, supra note 60, at 22-25.
Denniston provided a comprehensive survey, conducted about two years prior
to the Westmoreland decision, of the type of television coverage allowed in those
states that permit television coverage ofjudicial proceedings. In 1982, 35 states
allowed television coverage in some form. Id. at 22. Many of these states have
only allowed television coverage since 1979. Id. For a discussion of the types of
coverage states allow, see infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
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experiment with cameras in the courtroom, it will only allow coverage of
appellate proceedings on the theory that the risk of distraction is less-
ened when there are no jurors, witnesses, or presentations of evi-
dence.10 2 Some states may then extend the coverage to allow television
broadcast of trials.' 0 3 When such coverage is allowed, a number of
states have enacted veto provisions which permit a trial participant to
withhold consent to the coverage.' 0 4 This veto power may be total or
partial and can be in the hands of the judge, defendant, prosecutor, wit-
ness, juror, or any combination of the participants. ' 0 5 These veto provi-
sions continue to exist even though the Supreme Court, in Chandler, held
that a veto provision was not constitutionally required.' 0 6
In the meantime, efforts have been made to provide guidelines for
the use of television cameras in the courtroom. In 1968, the ABA
drafted standards for balancing the interests of a fair trial and a free
press.' 0 7 These standards were met with criticism from the media be-
cause a primary goal of the ABA's report was to prevent judges and
attorneys from revealing certain types of information to the press.' 0 8 As
102. Denniston, supra note 60, at 24. Denniston commented:
[A]ppeals hearings are usually short on drama and long on technical
legal argument. Indeed, they are not often considered to be very news-
worthy even by news directors normally eager to have the courts cov-
ered by TV and radio. An appeals-only rule thus tends to mean that
the cameras won't be around much of the time.
Id.
103. Id. When trials are made accessible to cameras, the news potential
increases dramatically and news organizations become more interested in broad-
casting the trial. Id.
104. Id. If the veto is total, then cameras are not allowed any access to the
proceedings when a participant objects. If the veto is partial, the cameras can
cover the trial, but the camera may have to be turned off at certain times or not
be directed at the objecting individuals. Id. A majority of states that allow cam-
eras in their courtrooms retain at least a partial veto, even though a veto provi-
sion is not constitutionally mandated. See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 577. In 1982, 24
states allowed cameras to cover criminal trials and 13 had veto provisions. But
of the 26 states that allowed coverage of civil trials only eight provided for a veto
by the parties or lawyers. Denniston, supra note 60, at 24. For a listing of the
various veto provisions implemented by the states, see id. at 22-23.
105. Denniston, supra note 60, at 22. Experience shows that judges are not
quick to use their veto power, while other trial participants use their veto power
much more frequently. Id. Defense attorneys almost always invoke their veto, as
demonstrated by the experience in the Florida program which allowed cameras
in its courtrooms. Id.
106. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 569-83. For the Chandler Court's discussion of
the veto provision, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
107. H. NELSON & D. TEETER, supra note 1, at 283. These standards were
drafted by a committee headed by Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Paul
Reardon, thus the committee's report became known as the Reardon Report. Id.
For a discussion of the current ABA standards on fair trial-free press, see infra
notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
108. H. NELSON & D. TEETER, supra note 1, at 283. The 1968 ABA report
focused on matters attorneys and judges should not discuss during the course of
a trial in order to protect the defendant's rights. Id. This restriction on the flow
1985] NOTE 1295
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a result, the press and ABA worked jointly in a number of states to draft
guidelines for the coverage of criminal trials. 10 9
Additionally, the ABA recently adopted standards that would not
prohibit television coverage of trials. I 10 In its fair trial-free press stan-
dards and its code ofjudicial conduct, the ABA provided for the televis-
ing of judicial proceedings if the coverage was consistent with the right
to a fair trial. I I I The new fair trial-free press standard allows cameras in
the courtroom; previous to its adoption, the standards were silent on the
right of access of cameras to the courtroom. This standard, adopted in
1982, was prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in Chandler." 
2
IV. ANALYSIS: AN ABSOLUTE BAN OF CAMERAS FROM COURTROOMS
VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The question of a constitutionally based right of access for cameras
to the courtroom necessarily raises questions of first, fifth, and sixth
amendment rights. The task of simultaneously protecting all these in-
terests is made more difficult because the Bill of Rights does not provide
a guideline for balancing fundamental rights. While a defendant must
of information concerned the media. Id. The media were especially concerned
with suggestions in the report that members of the media could be charged with
contempt if they published a prejudicial statement about a trial. Id. The current
ABA standards show a greater respect for the first amendment rights of the me-
dia. For a discussion of the ABA standards, see supra notes 41-43 and accompa-
nying text and infra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
109. H. NELSON & D. TEETER, supra note 1, at 284.
110. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)7 (1983).
i1. Id. Canon 3(A)7 would allow broadcast coverage of trials. This provi-
sion was the successor to Canon 35, which prohibited such coverage. Id. For a
discussion of Canon 35, see supra note 4 arid accompanying text.
Canon 3(A)7 provides:
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or
photographing in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto
during sessions of court, or recesses between sessions, except that
under rules prescribed by a supervising appellate court or other appro-
priate authority, a judge may authorize broadcasting, televising, record-
ing and photographing ofjudicial proceedings in courtrooms and areas
immediately adjacent thereto consistent with the right of the parties to
a fair trial and subject to express conditions, limitations, and guidelines
which allow such coverage in a manner that will be unobtrusive, will not
distract the trial participants, and will not otherwise interfere with the
administration of justice.
ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)7 (1983).
The ABA adopted the identical standard in its fair-trial-free press standards.
Prior to the adoption of this standard in 1982, these fair trial-free press stan-
dards were silent on the issue of broadcasting courtroom proceedings. ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 41, at Standard 8-3. (standard has not yet been
numbered).
112. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 41, at Standard 8-3. (standard has not yet
been numbered). As the history of the standard indicates, the ABA House of
Delegates adopted the standard, prompted in large part by Chandler. Id. For
discussion of Chandler, see supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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be protected from adverse pretrial and trial publicity,' '3 the public and
press have a right of access that also deserves protection.' 14 In addi-
tion, there are potentially negative consequences for the judicial system
when the public and press are excluded from judicial proceedings. 1 15
Open trials are essential to preventing excesses within the judicial sys-
tem and encouraging effectiveness in the judicial process.' I 1 In the
past, the media's right to cover trials and a defendant's right to a fair
trial have seemingly been in conflict, as evidenced by Supreme Court
decisions overturning convictions because of prejudicial publicity.' 17 It
is submitted that one right need not be chosen over the other since
courts possess adequate tools both to allow access and to protect a de-
fendant's rights.' 18
In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court ruled that both the
press and public have a constitutional right of access to criminal
trials. ' 19 Furthermore, in Chandler, the Court ruled that it was not inher-
113. For a discussion of the potential prejudicial effects of pretrial and trial
publicity, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of the Richmond Newspapers decision, which granted
this right of access, see supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
115. It is submitted that if courts are correct in finding that open trials
serve a useful purpose, then closing trials risks the danger that the public will
lose confidence in the proceedings and that there will be a lessened check on the
judicial process. For a discussion of some of the purposes served by an open
trial, see supra notes 57, 67 & 110.
116. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 421 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). In his dissent, Jus-
tice Blackmun traced the history of the open trial. Id. He noted that early advo-
cates of open trials spoke of the role open trials played in maintaining the
effectiveness of the trial process. Id. Justice Blackmun also noted that commen-
tators have recognized that open trials provide a check againstjudicial abuse. Id.
The Richmond Newspapers Court also noted that open trials have a therapeu-
tic value for the community. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-72 (plurality
opinion). When a crime occurs, especially a shocking crime, an open judicial
process serves the purpose of providing an outlet for community concern, hos-
tility, and emotion. Id. at 571 (plurality opinion). When the judicial process is
closed, the community loses this outlet. Id. In addition, people must perceive
the judicial process as being effective in order for the process to work effectively.
This perception is best realized when people have the opportunity to observe
the judicial process. Id. at 571-72 (plurality opinion). Society would have a diffi-
cult time accepting an institution if it was prohibited from observing the institu-
tion. When a trial is conducted in the open, the Court concluded, there is an
opportunity for people to understand the system in general and as it functions in
a particular case. Id.
117. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 551-53. For a discussion of the Nebraska
Press Court's survey of these cases, see supra note 20.
118. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 611-12 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan stated that he "would reject the notion that a choice [between the first
and sixth amendments] is necessary, that there is an inherent conflict that can-
not be resolved without essentially abrogating one right or the other." Id. at 612
(Brennan, J., concurring).
119. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion). For a discus-
sion of Richmond Newspapers, see supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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ently unconstitutional to televise courtroom proceedings.120 The Court
has not directly addressed the issue of whether an absolute ban of cam-
eras from a courtroom violates the first amendment. There are indica-
tions, however, that the Court would not be receptive to the idea of a
constitutionally based right of access for cameras in courtrooms. Chief
Justice Burger has expressed his commitment to keeping cameras out of
the federal courts.' 2 ' Additionally, the Supreme Court has promulgated
rules that prohibit cameras from criminal trials in federal court-
rooms. 122 Finally, some cases implicitly reject the existence of an abso-
lute constitutional right of access. 1 23
While there are serious constitutional questions raised by an abso-
lute ban on the access of cameras to federal courtrooms, it is not difficult
to suggest that an absolute ban on the right of access of cameras is per-
missible. The guarantees enumerated in the first amendment are not
absolute.' 2 4 There are restrictions on these rights; for example, speech
that is slanderous or libelous is subject to punishment. 125 More impor-
tantly in the context of the present debate, first amendment rights are
subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.1 26
Both the Kerley court' 2 7 and the Hastings court 128 found that an ab-
solute denial of access for cameras to federal courtrooms was a time,
place, and manner restriction. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
never directly addressed the issue of access of cameras to court proceed-
ings in the context of the existence of a first amendment right of access
to trials.' 2 9 Despite Kerley and Hastings, it is submitted that a complete
denial of access for cameras to courtrooms is not a time, place, and man-
ner restriction, as the Supreme Court has defined these types of restric-
tions. 130 Instead, the decision to ban absolutely cameras from a
120. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 582-83. For a discussion of Chandler, see supra
notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of Chief Justice Burger's hostility to cameras in the
courtroom, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
122. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. For a discussion of this rule, see supra note 30.
123. For a discussion of two such cases, see supra notes 56 & 69 and accom-
panying text.
124. For text of the first amendment, see supra note 8.
125. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 606 (1978). Professor
Tribe noted that statements intended to inflict injury are outside the purview of
the first amendment. Id. See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (court recognized defamation action against public official, but held con-
stitutional guarantees limit when a public official may recover).
126. For a discussion of time, place, and manner restrictions, see supra
notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
127. See Kerley, 753 F.2d at 620.
128. See Hastings, 695 F.2d at 1282.
129. The Supreme Court has discussed this issue in the context of a de-
fendant's rights. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
130. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581-82 n.18 (plurality opinion)
("[Tihe question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not
to deny or unwarrantedly abridge... the opportunities for the communication
1298 [Vol. 30: p. 1267
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courtroom should be governed by a stricter standard, such as the Globe
Newspaper standard. 13 ' Such a conclusion is inevitable if the right of ac-
cess is to be meaningful.' 3 2 The right of trial access ceases to be mean-
ingful when cameras are absolutely banned from courtrooms, since
restrictions on media access affect the media's ability to effectively cover
a trial. For example, if members of the press were allowed access to a
trial but were not allowed to take notes, this would severely affect their
ability to accurately report on the proceedings. In other words, the type
of access permitted is directly related to the media's ability and effective-
ness in covering the trial.
Television is a unique medium, and its unique qualities must be
considered when applying first amendment principles. Unlike the print
medium, television has the capability to cover a trial in its entirety-
every word, every sentence, and every gesture. Television is also argua-
bly a more direct medium, in that it can convey the moods and nuances
of a trial, and provide the public with first-hand information about a trial
or testimony rather than second-hand information through someone
else's words. Because the television medium is qualitatively different, it
has the capability to provide qualitatively different coverage of trials,
and this should be reflected in the first amendment right of access to
trials. 3 3 This is especially true when a ban of cameras from courtrooms
denies the public television coverage of issues of national importance' 34
of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with
resort to public places." Id. (quoting Cox v. New Hamsphire, 312 U.S. 569, 574
(1941)). For a discussion of the time, place, and manner standard, see supra
notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
131. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07. Because there was a
mandatory closure of the trial in Globe Newspaper, the Court required that the
state show a compelling governmental interest. Id. It is submitted that a rule
that completely prohibits the use of cameras in courtrooms is more akin to the
mandatory closure rule in Globe Newspaper than it is to the time, place, and man-
ner regulation of the location of adult movie theaters in Young. See Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For a discussion of 1oung, see
supra note 74. For a discussion of the standard applied in Globe Newspaper, see
supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
132. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576-77. The Richmond Newspapers
Court stated: "The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concern-
ing what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the
trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily." Id. (footnote omitted).
Analogously, the right of access also loses meaning if the media cannot use the
tools of their trade. Just as a reporter not at a trial cannot report as fully as if he
were there, television coverage cannot be as complete or accurate when the use
of cameras is denied.
133. It is submitted that a complete ban on cameras in the courtroom de-
prives the public of access to information which could otherwise be obtained
only through actually being present in the courtroom.
134. For a discussion of a case that had implications of national importance,
see infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
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or issues of deep interest to the community.' 3 5
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that the press
plays an important role in preserving the integrity of the judicial system
since few members of the public actually attend trials.' 3 6 Press cover-
age, then, helps to serve the purposes of the open trial-to foster confi-
dence in the judicial process and to check potential judicial abuses.' 37
Therefore, the restriction of the media's access to a trial limits its ability
to fully and completely report on court proceedings. Since the role the
public and press play in ensuring the integrity of the judicial system is
one reason access to trials was accorded first amendment protection,' 38
a restriction that limits the press' ability to fulfill that role is arguably
violative of the first amendment.
A related question is whether a distinction between types of media
coverage is reasonable under the first amendment. It is submitted that
distinguishing the access of cameras from other types of access is not a
reasonable distinction. When the press covers a trial, a major concern is
the potentially adverse effect that the coverage will have on the trial pro-
cess. 139 Televised coverage of a trial will not necessarily result in preju-
dice more readily than non-televised coverage of a trial for several
reasons. First, a judge has the power to sequester the jury, which would
prevent jurors from viewing trial coverage. 140 Second, a newsworthy
trial will generate extensive media coverage, with or without television
coverage of the trial.'41
135. For a discussion of a case that would be of interest to a community, see
infra note 156 and accompanying text.
136. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73 (plurality opinion). The
court noted that public attendance at trials is no longer a widespread occur-
rence. Id. at 572 (plurality opinion). Since the public no longer receives its in-
formation firsthand or by word of mouth, the public acquires this information
through the media. Id. at 572-73 (plurality opinion). While the press is entitled
only to the same right of access as the public, it often receives special seating
and priority of entry so it can report on the proceedings. Id. at 573 (plurality
opinion). This, the Court stated, "contribute[s] to public understanding of the
rule of law and to comprehension of. the functioning of the entire criminal jus-
tice system." Id. (quoting Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 587).
137. Hastings, 695 F.2d at 1283 (citations omitted). For a further discussion
of the benefits of an open trial addressed in Hastings, see supra note 87 and ac-
companying text. The Supreme Court has also stressed the importance of open
trials. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's view on this issue, see supra notes
57 & 67 and accompanying text.
138. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606. The Court in Globe Newspaper com-
mented that access to criminal trials allows the public to scrutinize the judicial
process, which safeguards and enhances the quality of the factfinding process.
This benefits both the public and the defendant. Id.
139. For a discussion of the potentially prejudicial effect of press coverage,
see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
140. For a discussion of the measures a judge can take to limit the poten-
tially prejudicial effects of publicity, see infra notes 163-72 and accompanying
text.
141. It is submitted that if the trial is one that interests the press, it will be
1300 [Vol. 30: p. 1267
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Another concern regarding the use of cameras in courtrooms is the
disruptive effect that their presence could have on the jury and wit-
nesses. 142 Numerous technological advances, however, have minimized
the disruptive effect that television cameras would have in a court-
room. 14 3 Moreover, the manner in which cameras are operated in the
courtroom could be subject to court-imposed guidelines, which would
minimize any potentially disruptive presence.
144
It is submitted that an absolute ban against cameras in the court-
room, which is in effect in a number of states and the federal court sys-
tem, is presumptively a violation of the first amendment. There are
situations in which all participants determine that coverage of the trial
would be proper and beneficial. One such case is Westmoreland, 14 5 which
involved allegations by CBS that General William Westmoreland mis-
covered extensively whether or not cameras are allowed in the courtroom. An
additional question, then, is whether television coverage generates potentially
prejudicial publicity to such a greater extent that a restriction is warranted to
protect the defendant's rights to a fair trial. It is submitted that the extent to
which television coverage is likely to produce increased prejudice is minimal,
especially in light of the powers a judge has to ensure the fairness of judicial
proceedings. For a discussion of these judicial powers, see infra notes 163-72
and accompanying text.
142. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 544-50. One of the major concerns of the Estes
Court was the disruptive effect that cameras could have on the entire proceed-
ing. Id. For a discussion of the concerns of the Estes Court, see supra note 16
and accompanying text.
143. See Chandler, 449 U.S. 576. The Chandler Court noted the changes in
technology occurring since 1965, the time of the Estes trial. Id. As one commen-
tator has suggested, the camera is now on its way to becoming as sensitive and
silent as the human eye. J. GERALD, supra note 3, at 151. The concern over
disruption caused by cameras in the courtroom stems from a period when equip-
ment was much less sophisticated than it is today. Id. Today, both still and
television cameras are less intrusive than they were at the time of the Estes deci-
sion. Id. at 161. Videotape can be used, as well as high-speed film, reducing the
need for flashes and other supplemental camera lighting. Id. High intensity
light bulbs placed in the existing light fixtures also work well when lighting in a
courtroom is especially dim. Id.
144. J. GERALD, supra note 3, at 161-63. Florida's experiment in televising
trials provides an example of guidelines designed to control the manner in
which cameras operate in the courtroom. For a discussion of these guidelines,
see supra note 22 and accompanying text. The Florida program limited the
number of cameras allowed in the courtroom and seating for the still camer-
amen was assigned. J. GERALD, supra note 3, at 161. Certain brand name equip-
ment was not allowed in the courtroom because it was too noisy. Id. at 162. The
court rules also prohibited pictures of the jury leaving or entering the court-
room. Id. at 163. One commentator has also suggested that a court could ap-
point a coordinator to deal with the press on its behalf, so that the judge does
not have to assume any extra duties himself. Id. at 161. It is submitted that
when the right of access of cameras is only subject to these types of restrictions
and is not prohibited, the restrictions, if reasonable, constitute constitutional
time, place, and manner restraints.
145. For a discussion of W1est/noreland, see supra notes 96-100 and accompa-
nying text.
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represented enemy troop strength during the Vietnam War. 14 6 West-
moreland, CBS, and the trial judge all were in favor of allowing the trial
to be broadcast, but both the district court and the circuit court rejected
the request on the basis that the judiciary, through its local rules of
court, regulates television coverage of trials. 14 7 Still, the Second Circuit
noted that the implications of the trial went far beyond the participants
in the lawsuit because the nature of the allegations was of national im-
portance.14 8 Thus, despite the desires of the participants in the trial and
despite the public's interest and arguably its right to know, cameras
were barred from recording the Westmoreland proceedings.' 49 It is sub-
mitted that such a restriction of access is not reasonable under the first
amendment.
To preserve the first amendment right of access that was recognized
146. Westmoreland, 752 F.2d at 18. In Westmoreland, one anticipated issue
was whether officers high in the United States military command willfully dis-
torted intelligence data to substantiate optimistic reports on the progress of the
war. See Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). This
was an issue as to which the American public had a great concern and a need to
be informed. Id.
147. 752 F.2d at 24. The Cable News Network (CNN) moved for an experi-
mental exception to the ban of cameras in the federal courts so that it could
provide television coverage of the trial. Id. at 19. All parties to the original suit
supported CNN's application. Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1166, 1170
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
The district court judge, persuaded by CNN's argument, stated: "My train-
ing in the long accepted tradition that banished the camera from the federal
courtroom produced an instinctive negative reaction. I have been taught to as-
sume that cameras would turn trials into vaudeville. A more careful reading of
the petition, however, reveals a powerful argument." Id. at 1167. The judge
was convinced by the petition but, nonetheless, rejected the petition because the
local rules of court and the ABA's code ofjudicial conduct prevented him from
allowing such coverage. Id. at 1170.
148. 752 F.2d at 18. The district court, which originally heard the petition
of CNN, stated that
the subject matter of this trial is of the most serious public importance.
Among the questions in dispute will be whether the high U.S. military
command in Vietnam engaged in willful distortion of intelligence data
to substantiate optimistic reports on the progress of the war and
whether one of the nation's most important distributors of news and
commentary engaged in willful or reckless slander. It can be expected
that the trial will go beyond the particulars of those two inquiries into
issues of appropriate standards for both military commanders and
press commentators.
The public interest is thus not the mere voyeurism that emerges
for a sensational murder trial. It is a response to a rare debate and
inquiry on issues of the highest national importance.
It could even be reasonably argued that the filming of this trial is
more important than its decision: historians and commentators on the
war and on the press will not accept the verdict of the jury and the
rulings of the judge as definitive answers. They will seek lessons and
conclusions by analysis of the witnesses' testimony.
Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
149. 596 F. Supp. at 1170.
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in Richmond Newspapers, it is also submitted that the presumption should
be in favor of permitting cameras in the courtroom.' 50 Such a presump-
tion would be analogous to the well established presumption against
prior restraints.' 5 ' A presumption in favor of access for television cov-
erage puts the burden on those seeking to restrict access, rather than
placing the burden on the media to justify why it should be granted ac-
cess to a trial.152 The right of access to trials is not meaningful without
a presumption in favor of access for cameras. Limiting the type of media
access to courtrooms undermines the media's ability to fully perform its
role in reporting on a trial.' 53 The right of access for cameras, however,
should not be absolute since the Supreme Court has made it clear that
the general right of access is not absolute.15 4
The test which the Supreme Court developed in Globe Newspaper for
determining when the public and press can be excluded from a trial
could be applied analogously when a court faces the question of whether
cameras are to be allowed access in a particular instance.15 5 When ac-
cess for cameras is completely denied, the Globe Newspaper test would
require that the government show a compelling interest in denying ac-
cess and that the order denying access be narrowly drawn. The right to
a fair trial, being a constitutionally guaranteed right, would be one such
compelling interest. The government would also be able to show a com-
pelling interest when a young child testifies, as in a case involving the
sexual abuse of the child.' 56 A complete denial of access, however,
would have to be the only way to guarantee a fair trial, if it is to satisfy
the narrowly drawn requirement. If a fair trial would be threatened by
the presence of cameras in the courtroom, then the order restricting
access should be as narrowly drawn as possible. For example, the court
could order a partial ban rather than banning cameras from the court-
room for the entire proceeding. It is submitted that the narrowly drawn
150. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577 (plurality opinion). For a dis-
cussion of the right of access recognized by the Supreme Court in Richmond
Newspapers, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's presumption against allowing
prior restraints, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
152. As when the government seeks to impose prior restraints, it is submit-
ted the burden should be on the party that seeks to prevent the access.
153. For a discussion of the importance of complete access as it affects the
media's ability to function most effectively, see supra notes 132-37 and accompa-
nying text.
154. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion). For a
discussion of the scope of the right of access recognized by the Supreme Court
in Richmond Newspapers, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the Court's right of access test in Globe Newspaper,
see supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
156. See Turning an Eye on the Lurid, NEWSWEEK, May 7, 1984, at 83. CNN
recently requested permission to televise the trial of Virginia McMartin, who was
accused of sexually abusing up to 100 children at her preschool in California.
Id. For a discussion of other potential competing interests, see supra note 70.
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test would require the use of means less restrictive than a complete de-
nial of access, if such means are available. Moreover, the test would not
be met if a denial of access for cameras would not further the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial.
The Globe Newspaper test could also be used in conjunction with the
test developed in Nebraska Press. The Nebraska Press test, which was devel-
oped in a case where prior restraints were imposed on press coverage of
a trial, also provides a useful guideline in determining when access
should be completely denied. Applying this test, a court would take into
consideration the extent and nature of the camera coverage, whether
other measures could mitigate the adverse effect of the coverage, and
whether the prohibition of access for cameras is the only way to achieve
the government's compelling interest. 15 7 This test would promote a
balance between first, fifth, and sixth amendment considerations, while
preventing serious infringement of any right. Because a court can pro-
tect the defendant's interest, the power of veto need not be given to any
of the trial participants, especially in light of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Chandler that a veto provision is not constitutionally required.' 58
If a particular restriction on the access of cameras was not absolute,
or did not completely deny access to a significant portion of a trial, it
could be deemed a time, place, or manner regulation, which would trig-
ger the use of a less stringent constitutional standard than the standard
applicable to an absolute ban. 15 9 Such a standard would involve a de-
termination of whether the restriction promoted a significant govern-
mental interest and whether the restriction unwarrantedly abridged
communication of thought.1(10 As the standard for a time, place, or
manner restriction would be easier to satisfy, it would allow for some
restrictions on the access of cameras to courtrooms. For example, regu-
lation of the placement of cameras, the number of cameras, and the use
of lights, along with similar limitations that would protect the right to a
fair trial, would be permissible. Restrictions on the number and place-
ment of cameras could effectively limit their intrusiveness and adverse
impact on trial participants. The less stringent standard governing time,
place, or manner regulations would be satisfied because these types of
restrictions would not unwarrantedly abridge communication of
thought. The quality of the picture being transmitted or the variety of
camera angles might be limited by court-imposed restrictions, but the
trial would still be broadcast, protecting that channel for the flow of in-
157. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562.
158. See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 557. For a discussion of the veto provision in
Chandler, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
159. For a discussion of the basis for a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction on first amendment rights, see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying
text.
160. For a discussion of the standard of review applicable to a time, place,
and manner regulation, see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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formation. In addition to protecting the communication of information,
the other prong of the test would be met in that significant governmen-
tal interests generally would be promoted by regulations concerning the
number and placement of cameras. Restrictions that limited the intru-
siveness of the cameras, for example, would limit their impact on those
in the courtroom and promote decorum in the courtroom.
Whether a court should allow live broadcast of a trial is another
question that could be governed by the time, place, and manner test.
Recently, an increasing number of requests for live broadcasts have
been made, as news stations have shown more interest in live television
coverage of trials.' 6 1 The live broadcast of a trial poses the threat of
immediate and irreparable harm that a delayed broadcast may not pres-
ent, such as the inadvertent release of a victim's name. 162 A court could
reasonably require the media to delay the televising of a trial where a
significant governmental interest is present. This type of restriction
would not constitute an absolute ban on access of cameras and would
not completely deny access. Thus, it would be correctly classified as a
time, place, and manner regulation.
There are a number of other factors that courts should consider
when applying these constitutional tests. Two of these factors are inter-
related-the likelihood that the defendant will receive a fair trial and the
trial judge's ability to control the effects of adverse publicity. The judi-
cial system has the capability to mitigate the effects of potentially preju-
dicial news coverage. First, an appellate court has the power to overturn
a conviction if the adverse publicity from the coverage was so extensive
as to deprive the defendant of his due process rights. 163 This remedy,
however, has serious drawbacks because of the increased institutional
161. There have been a number of recent requests to televise publicized
cases. See, e.g., Vestmoreland, 596 F. Supp. at 1167; the McMartin child sex abuse
case, supra note 156; the Massachusetts gang rape case, infra note 162.
162. See DeSilva, The Gang Rape Story, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June
1984, at 42-46. For example, if a court required a delay of a broadcast, it could
ensure that a rape victim's name would not be inadvertently released during the
broadcast of the trial. In February, 1984, six defendants went on trial for the
rape of a woman in a New Bedford, Massachusetts, bar. Id. at 42. Prior to the
trial, a traditional self-imposed ban by the media not to reveal the name of a
rape victim was in place. The trial, however, was being covered live by four news
organizations, including CNN. Id. The victim's name was spoken and was heard
across the country instantaneously. Id. Id. Thus, while the trial judge prohib-
ited the showing of the victim's face, her name was broadcast nationwide. Id. It
is submitted that if the broadcast had been delayed, the victim could have re-
mained anonymous.
163. For a discussion of the cases in which the Supreme Court has over-
turned convictions because of prejudicial publicity, see supra note 20 and accom-
panying text. In Chandler, the Supreme Court also noted that when Florida
allowed cameras in its courtrooms, Florida required that the defendant's objec-
tions be considered on the record, which would ensure that the defendant pre-
served his right to appeal on the ground that his trial was prejudiced by the
television coverage. 449 U.S. at 577.
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costs stemming from an appeal and possible retrial, and because the
passage of time might prevent the case from being retried at all. 164 De-
spite these drawbacks, a conviction nonetheless can be overturned,
thereby preventing permanent harm to the individual if the conviction
resulted from prejudicial publicity. Second, a court can use voir dire
examination to determine not only potential juror prejudice, but also to
determine whether the presence of cameras in the courtroom would be
likely to distract a potential juror. 165 The defense and prosecution
could be given additional peremptory challenges to ensure that the ju-
rors will not be prejudiced by the presence of cameras in the court-
room. 16 6 Third, a court could grant a continuance or change of venue
when publicity is excessive, but the effectiveness of these measures
would be proportional to the media's and the public's interest in the
trial.1 6 7 If a trial is one that the media has a strong interest in televising,
a continuance or change of venue would not likely result in a reduction
of the coverage.
A trial judge may also instruct the jury not to allow the presence of a
camera to distract them or interfere with their deliberations. Further,
the judge could instruct the jury not to watch themselves or the trial on
television.1 68 If the case warranted it, the judge could sequester the jury
to prevent any prejudicial effect. 169 In addition, witnesses could be se-
questered if exposure to the trial coverage would be likely to prejudice
their testimony.' 70 It is submitted that the use of these measures, either
164. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 555. In addition, the appeals process places
a hardship on the defendant. Not only are there delays and increased costs for
the defendant, but delay also makes a case more difficult to try. Moreover, there
are increased costs for the state. D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 261 (1977).
165. D. PEMBER, supra note 164, at 262. There are difficulties with this pro-
cedure as well. Voir dire examination ofjurors only uncovers prejudice that the
juror is aware of, and that the juror is not too embarrassed to admit. Id.
The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights noted in its 1976 report
that in a sensational trial, the court would give leeway to counsel on voir dire to
extend their questioning beyond the traditional scope of examination. FREE
PRESS-FAIR TRIAL, supra note 41, at 18.
166. FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL, supra note 41, at 18. The report concluded
that the number of peremptory challenges necessary to counter jury bias should
be expanded. Id.
167. D. PEMBER, supra note 164, at 263. Even with a change of venue or
continuance, publicity might move with a trial commanding great public atten-
tion. The more sensational the trial, the less likely a change of venue will affect
the amount of publicity. Id.
168. Id. The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights concluded
that an admonition would be effective generally in countering juror prejudice
and that such counseling from the judge would have a profound psychological
influence on the jurors. FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL, supra note 41, at 19.
169. FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL, supra note 41, at 18. While sequestration is a
highly effective means of countering potentially prejudicial publicity during a
trial, it is costly and poses a hardship to jurors. Id.
170. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 41, at 8-3.6(b). In addition to sequester-
ing witnesses, standard 8-3.6(b) provides that if witnesses are likely to be ex-
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singly or in combination, would be effective in protecting a defendant
against unfair prejudice.171 These protective measures potentially add
costs to operating the judicial system, but increased costs cannot be a
consideration in deciding whether the right of access of cameras to the
courtroom is guaranteed under the Constitution.172
In addition to constitutional considerations, there are practical con-
siderations that favor permitting cameras in the courtroom. Providing
access for cameras to courtrooms satisfies the public's need to know and
its interest in knowing the workings of the judicial system.' 73 The tele-
vising of trials would help educate the public as to the American legal
process and the law,' 74 and provide the public with the opportunity to
posed to reports that will influence their testimony, the judge should instruct
jurors and court personnel not to make statements to the press, admonish the
jury not to be distracted by the presence of cameras, and question jurors about
their exposure to the publicity. Id.
171. FREE PREss-FAIR TRIAL, supra note 41, at 15. A survey of judges con-
tained in this Senate report reflects how effective they consider certain actions to
be in countering potentially prejudicial publicity:
Strongly or
Method Moderately Effective
Continuance 82.1%
Severance 77.8%
Change of Venue 77.2%
Voir Dire 47.6%
Sequestration 86.9%
Admonition 62.1%
Id. This survey was based on the use of only one of these methods at one time.
If these measures were used in conjunction with one another their effectiveness
would likely increase. Id.
172. While these measures could be more costly and could produce an ad-
ditional burden on the judiciary, it is submitted that the determination of
whether a constitutional right exists should not be based solely on considera-
tions of cost and convenience. Additional cost should not be sufficient to satisfy
the compelling state interest required to close a trial to the press and public.
For a discussion of factors that would be compelling, see supra note 70 and ac-
companying text. Cost considerations, however, could comprise the significant
governmental interest required to justify a time, place, or manner restriction
such as a partial closing of proceedings. Such a governmental interest would
only be sufficient upon a showing that a limitation on camera or television cover-
age alone, as distinct from a limitation on the coverage of the media as a whole,
would save the court from having to take such measures as sequestering the jury
and witnesses. Thus, if a court bans television cameras from the courtroom, the
court must justify such a ban on the basis of why broadcast coverage infringes on
the right to a fair trial when other types of media coverage would not infringe on
that right. For a discussion of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions,
see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the purposes served by open trials, see supra notes
57 & 67 and accompanying text.
174. See In re Extension of Media Coverage, 472 A.2d 1232, 1234 (R.I.
1984). The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that its primary reason for al-
lowing television coverage in state courtrooms was the potential contribution
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witness important debates on issues of public interest. 17 5
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed whether an abso-
lute ban against cameras in courtrooms is constitutionally permissible in
light of the existence of a constitutional right of access to criminal trials.
Arguably, an absolute ban of cameras from courtrooms is not a reason-
able restriction on the first amendment right of access. The constitu-
tional right to have cameras in the courtroom, however, should not be
an absolute one. Rather, this right of access should be subject to restric-
tions based on compelling governmental interests or restrictions that
are reasonable time, place, or manner regulations. Cameras in the
courtroom do not necessarily infringe upon a defendant's right to a fair
trial. Providing a constitutionally guaranteed right of access for cameras
in the courtroom, under an analysis that provides for restrictions when
there is a sufficiently important governmental interest, ensures the ful-
lest realization of first, fifth, and sixth amendment rights.
Carolyn E. Riemer
the media could make in increasing public understanding ofjudicial proceedings
and decisions. Id. at 1234.
In Westmoreland, the trial court also argued that it would be in the federal
judicial system's interest to allow cameras in the courtrooms to give the public a
chance to observe the judiciary in action. 596 F. Supp. at 1169. The court
stated:
I believe in sum that the federal judges are on the whole an admi-
rable bunch who little deserve the low esteem in which they are held by
public reputation. I suggest that the gap between the reality and the
perception results largely from the fact that the public has little oppor-
tunity to see how scrupulously, how painstakingly and how fairly fed-
eral judges conduct court business.
Id.
175. The Westmoreland case provides an excellent example of an issue of
public interest. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 96-100 & 146-49
and accompanying text.
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